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Choosing Between the Advice of Counsel Defense to 
Willful Patent Infringement or the Effective 
Assistance of Trial Counsel:   
A Bridge or the Troubled Waters? 
Christopher A. Harkins 
Abstract 
 
Trouble is brewing for patent infringement defendants who use lawyers from one law 
firm to act as trial counsel and other lawyers from the same or different firm (albeit perfectly 
screened off from the trial team) to prepare a non-infringement opinion as an advice of counsel 
defense to allegations of willful infringement.  The 2006 Federal Circuit decision in EchoStar 
has set off a veritable feeding frenzy of attacks by patentees’ counsel on the most sacred of 
attorney client communications and work product: that of trial counsel.  In a case of first 
impression, one federal court has even granted a motion to disqualify the trial counsel shortly 
before the jury trial was to begin, when a member of that firm had given the client an opinion 
relevant to non-willfulness, thereby turning the advice of counsel defense to willfulness on its 
head.  Consequently, the potential for grave abuses of, and misguided extensions of, the 
EchoStar decision is rife with confusion and threatens to invade and destroy a defendant’s ability 
not only to rely on the defense but to deny it effective assistance of trial counsel if it does.  Was 
the motion to disqualify the law firm mandated by ethics or merely motivated by gamesmanship?  
Is this a case of first impression from a renegade court or a prescient avant-garde likely to trigger 
cascading decisions that follow suit?  The current state of flux in the law forecasts dire 
consequences if an opinion of counsel may be used as fodder for declaring open season on trial 
counsel, thereby morphing the defense into the troubled water instead of a “bridge over troubled 
water” as intended.  The article proposes a coherent and equitable balancing test that will bring 
clarity and fairness to the potentially chilling effect on discussions between trial counsel and its 
client in the wake of EchoStar.   
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Choosing Between the Advice of Counsel Defense 
to Willful Patent Infringement or the Effective 
Assistance of Trial Counsel:   
A Bridge or the Troubled Waters? 
Christopher A. Harkins* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
¶1 You’ve got mail.  It is a nasty-gram naming you a patent infringer and threatening 
you with a federal lawsuit, or it is a complaint for patent infringement.   
¶2 After consulting with your patent attorney, you are told that the complaint (or the 
letter) has put you on notice of the infringement allegations.  Under either scenario, the 
patentee may later, if it has not already, allege willful infringement if you continue selling 
the accused product.  In patent law, willfulness may well be the pot of gold at the end of 
the patentee’s rainbow, because it could subject the defendant1 to treble damages and 
attorneys’ fees.  If the accused product is one of your primary moneymakers, then a 
business decision might well militate in favor of continuing sales as opposed to pulling 
the product off the market, but that strategy translates into the possibility that you may be 
required to pay up to three times any damages the plaintiff proves at trial, and patent 
damages have been known to reach millions and hundreds of millions.   
¶3 What do you do? 
¶4 Get an opinion.  Although it has been estimated that opinions can cost $40,000 
each and possibly as much as $100,000 apiece,2 if the product is found to have infringed 
                                                 
* Counsel, Brinks Hofer Gilson & Lione, Chicago, Illinois.  Christopher A. Harkins specializes in litigation 
involving patents, copyrights, and trade secrets, and in prosecuting patent applications in the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office and worldwide under the Patent Cooperation Treaty.  Mr. Harkins may be 
reached at charkins@usebrinks.com.  The views expressed herein are those of the author alone and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of Brinks Hofer Gilson & Lione or its clients. 
1 For simplicity, the term “plaintiff” refers to patent owners suing for patent infringement or defending 
against a declaratory judgment action based on their cease and desist letter.  The term “defendant” refers to 
a party accused of patent infringement and who is either being sued for patent infringement or is bringing a 
declaratory judgment action for non-infringement. 
2 BD. ON SCI., TECH., & ECON. POLICY, POLICY & GLOBAL AFFAIRS DIV., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF 
THE NAT’L ACADS., A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 119 (Steven A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004), available at 
http://books.nap.edu/html/patentsystem/0309089107.pdf (“[Lawyers] provid[e] such opinions at a cost 
ranging from $10,000 to $100,000 per opinion.”); Patent Quality Improvement:  Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property, Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
108th Cong. 58 (2003) (statement of David M. Simon, Chief Patent Counsel, Intel Corporation), available 
at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/hju88545.000/hju88545_0.htm (“Paying $40,000 per 
patent for an opinion of counsel to be used to rebut the charge of willful infringement is not cost effective 
given the volume of such notices.”).  
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any valid claim of the patent, the opinion has the potential of staving off treble damages – 
like buying insurance against an otherwise staggering amount of damages stemming from 
a finding of willfulness.  Even if the opinion is ultimately wrong and the fact finder 
concludes that the product infringed any patent claim, the opinion (if competent and 
sufficient) goes to the defendant’s state of mind and could possibly vitiate a finding of 
willfulness and bad faith. 
¶5 One such opinion might be that the accused product does not infringe any valid 
claim.  Although there are also opinions that the asserted patent is invalid, the non-
infringement opinion tends to be the most expedient given that patents are presumed to be 
valid as a matter of law,3 and it is a defendant’s burden4 to overcome that presumption by 
the hefty weight of clear and convincing evidence.5   
¶6 Who should give the opinion?  Many potential defendants elect to engage the 
same law firm to both write the opinion and serve as trial counsel, perhaps thinking the 
matter will never go to trial.  Or perhaps they have a longtime relationship with the law 
firm, feel comfortable with a group of attorneys there, and those attorneys have over the 
years become intimately familiar with the client’s business and products such that there is 
a real comparative advantage, savings, and fewer interruptions from using the same law 
firm.  Other potential infringers use two law firms, one for the trial team and the other for 
the opinion of counsel.  Either way, the potential infringer follows the rules and 
intentionally keeps the opinion counsel and trial counsel completely separate and 
independent such that trial counsel plays no role in, makes no contribution to, and does 
not influence the drafting of the opinion or otherwise breach the screening wall between 
itself and opining counsel.   
¶7 The doctrine of attorney-client privilege is ubiquitous in law.  Every client, 
attorney, and law student knows of it, and it is protected by the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.6  Seemingly every communication between client and lawyer for the purpose 
of rendering legal advice will be covered by the privilege.  Clearly, the opinion letter 
                                                 
3 “A patent shall be presumed valid.  Each claim of a patent (whether in independent, dependent, or 
multiple dependent form) shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other claims; dependent 
or multiple dependent claims shall be presumed valid even though dependent upon an invalid claim.”  
35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006). 
4 The plaintiff asserting a patent in a patent infringement lawsuit need not show that the patent is valid and 
enforceable.  “The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on the party 
asserting such invalidity.”  Id.   
5 SRAM Corp. v. AD-II Eng’g, Inc., 465 F.3d 1351, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Nystrom v. Trex Co., 424 F.3d 
1136, 1149 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“A party seeking to establish that particular claims are invalid must overcome 
the presumption of validity in 35 U.S.C. § 282 by clear and convincing evidence.”(citation omitted)).   
6 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure prohibit discovery of “privileged” matter.  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); 
(“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged.”).  The discovery rules did not codify, 
however, a definition of “privileged” matter.  See FED. R. EVID. 501; United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 
465 U.S. 792, 804 & n.25 (1984) (“Rule 501 was adopted precisely because Congress wished to leave 
privilege questions to the courts rather than attempt to codify them.”).  Instead, Congress looked to the 
courts for guidance in supplying definitions.  Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996) (holding that Rule 
501 “did not freeze the law governing the privileges of witnesses in federal trials at a particular point in our 
history, but rather directed federal courts to continue the evolutionary development of testimonial 
privileges”).  Nevertheless, it is beyond cavil that the attorney-client privilege has been long recognized by 
the Supreme Court, federal, and state courts of the United States.  Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 
389 (1981) (“The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential communications 
known to the common law.”). 
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from patent counsel to the client discussing the issue of non-infringement meets the 
definition of the privilege.   
¶8 But a defendant is at crossroads when willful infringement becomes an issue:  risk 
treble damages by exercising the attorney-client privilege on the one hand or assert the 
opinion in defense of willfulness allegations and thereby waive the privilege on the other.  
In response to a defendant’s asserting the opinion letter, a plaintiff commonly serves 
discovery requests seeking production of all legal advice given by all opining attorneys to 
the client that relates to the subject matter of the legal advice no matter how tenuous, and 
files motions to compel production if necessary.  Moreover, the Federal Circuit’s recent 
EchoStar7 decision might give fodder to extending those discovery requests and that 
motion to compel to all work product of the trial counsel, including depositions and 
document requests served upon the trial team.  What’s next? 
¶9 The next invasion into and abrogation of the attorney-client privilege—one of 
great importance and stark consequences to law firms and their clients—could very well 
be to disqualify the trial counsel from participating at trial once a defendant asserts the 
opinion letter as a defense to willful infringement.  In such circumstances, the plaintiff 
stands to gain much leverage in negotiations or at trial by removing the defendant’s trial 
counsel of choice and by forcing new counsel to learn the case at the later stages of 
complex patent litigation.  Under this novel theory of disqualification, the trial counsel 
might be removed from the trial of the case even when there is a perfect screening wall 
between the opining counsel and the trial counsel.  Critics who argue that non-
infringement opinions are just self-serving get-out-of-jail free cards should be cheering 
this decision as foretelling a day when those opinions will be “plutoed.”   
¶10 The possibility that a patentee may obtain full discovery of all communications 
between the trial team and the client, or even disqualification of the trial team if they 
comment on the opinion of counsel, has stunning implications.  Out of fear that their 
attorney-client communications will need to be revealed to the opposing party, trial 
counsel will stop communicating with the client regarding the litigation, views on the 
issues in the cases, or even the evaluations of the case for settlement.  But those 
communications about the case form the very fabric of what trial attorneys do.  This will 
result in the trial team never consulting with the client and thereby depriving the client of 
the effective assistance of counsel, or it will result in the preclusion of any defendant ever 
receiving or relying on advice of counsel as a defense to willful infringement.  Either 
result is untenable. 
¶11 Now, for those defense attorneys who are not already burning the author in effigy, 
let’s all just exhale, put down those pitchforks, and listen.  This article is not wedded to 
the novel disqualification theory or the open season on trial counsel’s communications 
with the client, and takes no credit or blame for it, depending on which side of the aisle 
one finds oneself in enforcing patents or defending against them.  But an ostrich with its 
head in the sand does not see the device to be used in the attack or how to defend against 
it.  Simply put, attorneys need to be forewarned of this novel theory and to advise their 
clients appropriately of the risks that a court might strictly prohibit all members of the 
testifying lawyer’s firm from serving as trial counsel.  
¶12 Specifically, Part II provides a background discussion on the law of willful 
infringement.  Part III explores the “advice of counsel” defense to willful infringement 
                                                 
7 In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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and the Hobson’s choice that some courts are placing on the accused infringers.  Part IV 
constructs an analysis that might prove useful in bringing clarity, balance, and fairness to 
case law that has the potential of turning the defense of advice of counsel on its head.   
II. BACKGROUND 
¶13 In order to understand the risk of treble damages and attorneys’ fees that may be 
awarded based on a finding of willfulness, one must first understand how courts struggle 
to interpret patents and then how the fact finder applies that interpretation to the accused 
product.  Accordingly, the discussion begins with an overview of the elements of patent 
infringement.   
A. Patent Infringement Analysis 
¶14 A patent infringement analysis involves two steps:  the threshold construction of 
the meaning and scope of the claims, and then the determination of whether the product 
or method in question infringes the properly construed claim.8   
1. The Law of Claim Construction  
¶15 The Patent Act of 1952,9 as amended, requires that every patent “shall conclude 
with one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject 
matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”10  The claims, however, do not stand 
alone, but are part of “a fully integrated written instrument.”11   
¶16 At first blush, then, some may analogize the patent, as a written instrument, to a 
contract, and interpret it to the same extent.  They would be wrong.12  The law of 
interpreting a patent involves intricate sets of its own technical rules,13 and therefore it is 
wholly inappropriate to think that one may simply borrow from traditional notions of 
contract law.14   
¶17 Given the complexity of claim construction, the Supreme Court in 1996 put to rest 
the issue of who decides the meaning of a claimed invention:  “We hold that the 
construction of a patent, including terms of art within its claim, is exclusively within the 
province of the court.”15  The object of claim construction is to determine what is meant 
                                                 
8 Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Athletic Alternatives, Inc., v. 
Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
9 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (current version at 35 U.S.C. § 1-376 (2006)). 
10 35 U.S.C. § 112 para. 2 (2006); Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“It is a 
‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which the patentee is 
entitled the right to exclude.’”) (citations omitted).   
11 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
12 Id. at 985 n.14 (“A patent, however, is not a contract.”).   
13 Markman v. Westview Intruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 389 (1996). 
14 Markman, 52 F.3d at 985 (“The analogy of a patent to a contract is not useful, however, in the context of 
a patent infringement suit.  Patents are not contracts per se and patent infringement actions have never been 
viewed as breach of contract actions.”). 
15 Markman, 517 U.S. at 372; see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1303 passim (restating the basic principles of 
claim construction for courts to apply); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454 (Fed. Cir. 
1998) (“[T]he court determines the scope and meaning of the patent claims,” especially given “the view 
that claim construction, as a form of ‘document construction,’ is solely a question of law.” (citation 
omitted)); Markman, 52 F.3d at 979 (“We therefore settle inconsistencies in our precedent and hold that in 
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by the terms used in the patent claims,16 and the end result is the court’s “statement of 
what is and is not covered by the technical terms and other words of the claims.”17   
¶18 Claim construction is a little like building lasagna when there are too many cooks 
in the kitchen – all cooks trying to add their own pasta, cheeses, and topping it off with 
their own sauce.  The combinations are almost limitless and constrained only by the 
cooks’ imaginations, from a variety of choices for noodles to a wide range of cheeses 
and, of course, to the sauce that may be meat or vegetarian and may have different spices 
as well as many other ingredients.  Similarly, the court’s recipe for claim construction is 
extremely complicated by the parties’ battles over what goes into the final dish, and how 
everything is argued and spun one way or the other.  To make its determination, the court 
considers intrinsic evidence and, sometimes, extrinsic evidence.  Three sources of 
intrinsic evidence are the claim language, the specification and, if in evidence, the 
prosecution history.18   
¶19 It is not an easy task for courts to construe the claims, because “the claims of 
patents have become highly technical in many respects as the result of special doctrines 
relating to the proper form and scope of claims that have been developed by the courts 
and the Patent Office.”19  In theory, the terms used in a claim are given the ordinary and 
customary meaning that the terms would have had to a person of ordinary skill in the art 
in question at the time of the invention.20  In practice, courts must be particularly nimble 
as they juggle evidence submitted by the parties of what the mythical person of ordinary 
skill in the art would have known as of the effective filing date of the patent application 
(a date that sometimes is as much as twenty years before the time when the court is 
supposed to construe the claim), and who is deemed to have read the term not only in the 
context of the claim in which it appears but also in the context of the entire patent 
specification.21   
¶20 The specification “is always highly relevant to the claim construction analysis”22 
as the best tool for determining the meaning of a claim term.  The specification’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
a case tried to a jury, the court has the power and obligation to construe as a matter of law the meaning of 
language used in the patent claim.  As such, ‘[a] patent covers the invention or inventions which the court, 
in construing its provisions, decides that it describes and claims.’”(citation omitted)).  
16 Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Markman, 52 F.3d at 979.   
17 Netword, L.L.C. v. Central Corp., 242 F.3d 1347, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Burke, Inc. v. Bruno 
Indep. Living Aids, Inc., 183 F.3d 1334, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“A claim in a patent provides the metes and 
bounds of the right which the patent confers on the patentee to exclude others from making, using or selling 
the protected invention.”).   
18 Gart, 254 F.3d at 1340; Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996); 
Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. 
19 Markman, 517 U.S. at 389.  
20 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. 
21 Id.  Because claim construction is purely a matter of law, courts have wide discretion to hear extrinsic 
evidence in determining questions of what the person of ordinary skill in the art would have known.  Id. at 
1318 (“We have also held that extrinsic evidence in the form of expert testimony can be useful to a court 
for a variety of purposes, such as to provide background on the technology at issue, to explain how an 
invention works, to ensure that the court’s understanding of the technical aspects of the patent is consistent 
with that of a person of skill in the art, or to establish that a particular term in the patent or the prior art has 
a particular meaning in the pertinent field.”); see also Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 
1455 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (“Nothing in the Supreme Court’s [Markman] opinion supports the view 
that the Court endorsed a silent, third option – that claim construction may involve subsidiary or underlying 
questions of fact.  To the contrary, the Court expressly stated that ‘treating interpretive issues as purely 
legal will promote (though not guarantee) intrajurisdictional certainty . . . . ’” (emphasis in original)). 
22 Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. 
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statements of what a term means are less likely to be litigation-inspired because they 
were made when the application was filed, before the patent issued and, thus, before there 
could have been alleged patent infringement.  But while the specification may act as a 
sort of dictionary23 in explaining the invention and in defining the claim terms, the 
specification too often lacks clarity and provides only a nebulous description of the 
scope24 of a claimed invention that almost always has changed during prosecution.25   
¶21 The prosecution history also plays an important role in claim interpretation.  The 
prosecution history helps to demonstrate how the inventor and the PTO understood the 
patent.26  As part of the intrinsic record, the prosecution history is relevant to determining 
how the inventor understood the invention and whether the inventor limited the invention 
by narrowing the claim scope.27  Also, an applicant who distinguishes the claimed 
invention over the prior art necessarily indicates what the claims do not cover.28  
Moreover, an applicant’s statements during prosecution are relevant to claim 
interpretation regardless of whether the examiner relied upon them.29  Furthermore, 
arguments made by the applicant in the prosecution history are given the same weight as 
claim amendments.30 
¶22 In addition to arguments relating to intrinsic evidence and what that evidence 
shows and does not show, the court can expect one or both parties to argue extrinsic 
evidence in support of the party’s proffered claim construction.  Extrinsic evidence 
consists of any evidence external to the patent and its file history, such as technical 
articles, inventor testimony, expert testimony, and, when relevant, statements made in the 
prosecution of a related foreign application.31   
                                                 
23 Markman, 52 F.3d at 979. 
24 Watts v. XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 882 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“One purpose for examining the specification 
is to determine if the patentee has limited the scope of the claims.”). 
25 Markman, 52 F.3d at 985 (“[I]t is not unusual for there to be a significant difference between what an 
inventor thinks his patented invention is and what the ultimate scope of the claims is after allowance by the 
PTO.”). 
26 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2005); see also Netword, L.L.C. v. Central Corp., 
242 F.3d 1347, 1351-52 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[Claims] do not have meaning removed from the context from 
which they arose.”).   
27 Chimie v. PPG Indus., Inc., 402 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The purpose of consulting the 
prosecution history in construing a claim is to ‘exclude any interpretation that was disclaimed during 
prosecution.’”(citation omitted)); Rheox, Inc. v. Entact, Inc., 276 F.3d 1319, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“The 
prosecution history limits the interpretation of claim terms so as to exclude any interpretation that was 
disclaimed during prosecution.”); Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 
1995) (“Claims may not be construed one way in order to obtain their allowance and in a different way 
against accused infringers.”).   
28 Spectrum Int’l, Inc. v. Sterilite Corp., 164 F.3d 1372, 1378-79 (Fed. Cir. 1998).   
29 Microsoft Corp. v. Multi-Tech Sys., Inc., 357 F.3d 1340, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2004).   
30 Hakim v. Cannon Avent Group, PLC, No. 05-1398, 2007 WL 542697, at *3 (Fed. Cir. Feb. 23, 2007) 
(“[An applicant may refile an application with broader claim scope than the parent application that matured 
into a patent, but] an applicant cannot recapture claim scope that was surrendered or disclaimed.  The 
district court did not err in holding that the examiner’s action in allowing the continuation claims without 
further prosecution was based on the prosecution argument in the parent.”); Elkay Mfg. Co. v. Ebco Mfg. 
Co., 192 F.3d 973, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
31 N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 215 F.3d 1281, 1295-96 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Vitronics Corp. v. 
Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996).  Extrinsic evidence cannot be used to construe the 
claims unless analysis of the intrinsic evidence leaves the disputed claim term unclear.  Id.  Even if 
extrinsic evidence is used, it cannot be used to arrive at a definition that contradicts either the claim 
language or the teachings of the specification.  Indeed, where the intrinsic evidence is clear, extrinsic 
evidence is entitled to no weight.  
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2. The Law of Infringement  
¶23 A patent gives the patentee the right to exclude for twenty years32 all others from 
practicing the claimed invention.33  A defendant “directly” infringes a patent by making, 
using, offering to sell, selling, or importing into the United States any product that 
embodies the patented invention.34  That is not, however, the only way to infringe a 
patent.  A defendant might be found liable for “indirect” infringement, such as by 
“inducement of infringement”35 or by “contributory infringement.”36  Both theories of 
indirect infringement depend on a preliminary finding of direct infringement, such that 
there can be no liability of active inducement of infringement or contributory 
infringement without the existence of direct infringement.37  The plaintiff need only prove 
patent infringement by a preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not).38   
¶24 For literal infringement, every element and limitation39 set forth in a claim must 
be found in the product or process in question – “exactly.”40  Any deviation from the 
claim precludes a finding of literal infringement.41   
                                                 
32 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
their Respective Writings and Discoveries”).  The patent term is 20 years from the date on which the 
application was filed.  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2006).   
33 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2006) (granting a patentee the “right to exclude others from making, using, 
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into the 
United States”).  A patent is a “negative” right to the extent that the patentee may exclude others from 
practicing the patentee’s invention, but this does not give the patentee a right to practice its own invention 
because by doing so the patentee might be infringing another’s patent.   
34 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without authority makes, 
uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United 
States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefore, infringes the patent.”).  Commentators 
debate whether there may ever be extraterritorial enforcement of intellectual property laws under Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution.  Compare John W. Osborne, A Rational Analytical Boundary 
for Determination of Infringement by Extraterritorially-Distributed Systems, 46 IDEA 587 (2006) (arguing 
that, under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c), (f), (g) (2006), a foreign defendant of an extraterritorially-distributed 
telecommunications system cannot infringe the patent if its activities relating to the patentably distinctive 
aspect of the claimed invention did not take place in the United States), with Christopher A. Harkins, 
Overcoming the Extraterritorial Bar to Bringing Copyright Actions:  On Pleading Copyright Infringement 
to Protect Copyrighted Works from the Defendant that Ships Overseas for Distribution Abroad, 17 INTELL. 
PROP. & TECH. L.J. 1, 7 (2005) (noting the extraterritorial bar to bringing copyright infringement suits but 
arguing for an exception to that rule, because “[w]hen defendants have committed at least one primary act 
of copyright infringement in the United States, the presumption against extraterritoriality ought not to 
defeat a court’s subject matter jurisdiction”).   
35 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2006) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an 
infringer.”). 
36 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006) (“Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the 
United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a material 
or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing 
the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a 
staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a 
contributory infringer.”). 
37 Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Zenith Labs., Inc. 
v. Bristol-Myers Squib Co., 19 F.3d 1418, 1423 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Joy Techs., Inc. v. Flakt, Inc., 6 F.3d 
770, 774 (Fed. Cir. 1993).  
38 Warner-Lambert Co. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 418 F.3d 1326, 1341 n.15 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  Direct and 
indirect infringement may be proven by circumstantial evidence.  Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 
449 F.3d 1209, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2006); Golden Blount, 438 F.3d at 1362. 
39 Dawn Equip. Co. v. Kentucky Farms, Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1014 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“The statute refers 
to claim ‘elements,’ but this court has moved toward the custom of referring to claim ‘limitations,’ 
reserving the word ‘elements’ for describing the parts of the accused device, though the court on occasion 
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¶25 While claim construction is a matter of law, infringement is a question of fact,42 
although factual questions of infringement are frequently resolved by a court’s 
construction of the claims because “to decide what the claims mean is nearly always to 
decide the case.”43  Yet, any differences between the claim construction and the accused 
product might seem subtle to the casual observer.  Moreover, as the uncertainties 
increase, the patentee may be more likely to enforce the patent and the defendant may be 
less likely to settle, thereby leading the parties to trial.  This uncertainty is exacerbated by 
the second method by which infringement may be proven.  
¶26 When there is no literal infringement, infringement can only be found under the 
doctrine of equivalents, which is an objective inquiry applied to individual elements or 
limitations of the claim, not to the invention as a whole.44  Whether an element of the 
accused device is equivalent to a claim limitation depends on whether the substitute 
element performs substantially the same function, in substantially the same way, and 
achieves substantially the same result as the claim limitation.45  The jury will be asked to 
return a verdict of infringement if any difference between a claim limitation and the 
accused product is insubstantial, such as when persons of ordinary skill in the art would 
consider that element of the product to be interchangeable with the corresponding claim 
requirement.46   
¶27 The doctrine of equivalents is the “exception, however, not the rule,” or else the 
public will come to believe that it cannot rely on the language of patent claims.47  Indeed, 
the patentee is prevented by prosecution history estoppel from relying on the doctrine 
when the patentee relinquished subject matter during the prosecution “by amendment or 
argument.”48  Under the “all elements rule,” the doctrine of equivalents may not be 
applied so broadly as to effectively eliminate a claim limitation in its entirety, such as 
when the limitation is missing from the accused product and is not replaced with an 
                                                                                                                                                 
continues to use the words interchangeably.”). 
40 DeMarini Sports, Inc. v. Worth, Inc., 239 F.3d 1314, 1331 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Literal infringement of a 
claim occurs when every limitation in the claim appears in the accused device, i.e., when ‘the properly 
construed claim reads on the accused device exactly.’”(citations omitted)).   
41 Lantech, Inc. v. Keip Mach. Co., 32 F.3d 542, 547 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  
42 PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 156 F.3d 1351, 1354-55 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[A]fter a court has 
defined the claim with whatever specificity and precision is warranted by the language of the claim and the 
evidence bearing on the proper construction, the task of determining whether the construed claim reads on 
the accused product is for the finder of fact.”). 
43 Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, J., concurring); see 
also Multiform Desiccants, Inc. v. Medzam, Ltd., 133 F.3d 1473, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“On occasion the 
issue of literal infringement may be resolved with the step of claim construction, for upon correct claim 
construction it may be apparent whether the accused device is within the claims.”).  But not every 
infringement question can be resolved by claim interpretation, especially when there is a dispute over 
whether the structure and function of the accused product meets the claim construction.  Int’l Rectifier 
Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 F.3d 1363, 1374-75 (Fed. Cir. 2004); see also PPG Indus., 156 F.3d at 1354-55. 
44 Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997).   
45 Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 1998).   
46 Multiform Desiccants, 133 F.3d at 1480-81. 
47 London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 945 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991); see also Markman v. 
Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996); Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 930 F.3d 
1576, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1996).   
48 DeMarini Sports, Inc. v. Worth, Inc., 239 F.3d 1314, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Seachange Int’l, Inc. 
v. C-Cor Inc., 413 F.3d 1361, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005).   
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equivalent substitute.49  The application of prosecution history estoppel and the all 
elements rule is a question of law.50   
¶28 Moreover, when a claim amendment is an amendment related to patentability, 
there arises a presumption of estoppel against the doctrine of equivalents, which 
presumption may only be overcome in a few “narrow ways.”51  The burden of rebutting 
the presumption lies with the patentee and is a question of law for the court.52  First, the 
patentee may attempt to show that the equivalent was unforeseeable as of the date of the 
claim amendment.53  Under this first criterion, the patentee generally tries to show that 
allegedly invalidating technology was “after-arising.”54  Second, the patentee may 
demonstrate that the amendment was merely tangential to the alleged equivalent.55  If the 
prior art that the patentee sought to overcome contained the alleged equivalent, then the 
amendment was not merely tangential.56  Third, the patentee might establish another 
reason why it could not have reasonably been expected to have described the alleged 
equivalent at the time of the amendment.57  The Federal Circuit has suggested that “the 
third criterion may be satisfied when there was some reason, such as the shortcomings of 
language, why the patentee was prevented from describing the alleged equivalent when it 
narrowed the claim.”58   
¶29 Whether under literal infringement or the doctrine of equivalents, if the 
independent claims are not infringed, then any claims that depend from those 
independent claims also are not infringed.59  The accused product may not avoid 
infringement, however, by including additional features and components.60   
                                                 
49 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29; Tronzo, 156 F.3d at 1160 (“If a theory of equivalence would vitiate a 
claim limitation, however, then there can be no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents as a matter 
of law.”); Seachange Int’l, 413 F.3d at 1378; DeMarini Sports, 239 F.3d at 1332; Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Nintendo Co., Ltd., 179 F.3d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563, 1568 
(Fed. Cir. 1996); Dolly, Inc. v. Spaulding & Evenflo Cos., 16 F.3d 394, 397 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Pennwalt 
Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (en banc).   
50 Seachange Int’l, 413 F.3d at 1378. 
51 Amgen Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 457 F.3d 1293, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing Festo Corp. v. 
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 740-41 (2002)).   
52 Amgen, 457 F.3d at 1312; see also Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 
1359, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc) (offering some guidance as to what must be shown in rebutting the 
Festo presumption under the three showings enumerated by the Supreme Court).   
53 Amgen, 457 F.3d at 1310.   
54 Id. at 1313 (But that “if the alleged equivalent were known in the prior art in the field of the invention, it 
certainly should have been foreseeable at the time of the amendment.”) (citation omitted).   
55 Id. at 1310.   
56 Id. at 1313.   
57 Id. at 1310-11.   
58 Id. at 1313.   
59 Jeneric/Pentron, Inc. v. Dillon Co., 205 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Wolverine World Wide, Inc. v. 
Nike, Inc., 38 F.3d 1192, 1199 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Wahpeton Canvas Co. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 
1552 n.9 & 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1989).   
60 Suntiger, Inc. v. Scientific Research Group, 189 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“It is fundamental that 
one cannot avoid infringement merely by adding elements if each element recited in the claim is found in 
the accused device.”); Vivid Techs, Inc. v. Am. Sci., 200 F.3d 795, 811 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[I]nfringement is 
not avoided by the presence of elements or steps in addition to those specifically recited in the claim.”). 
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B. Willful Infringement and Patent Damages 
¶30 Even innocent parties may be liable for patent infringement,61 because while 
culpability of the infringer may come into play in determining the amount of damages 
owed to the patent owner, an innocent infringer is no less liable than a willful infringer.62  
Rather, there must be a finding of actual infringement, and then a separate determination 
of whether the defendant’s infringement was willful, as explained below.   
1. Hear No Evil, See No Evil, and the Duty of Due Care 
¶31 When a person becomes aware that a patent may be relevant to a product it sells, a 
duty arises to exercise due care and to investigate whether or not the product infringes 
any valid, enforceable claim of the patent.63  In other words, a defendant who 
intentionally blinds itself to the facts and law, and then continues to infringe, may be 
found to be a willful infringer.64   
¶32 When is the duty triggered?  As a general rule, as soon as there is “actual notice of 
another’s patent,” there is an affirmative duty to investigate whether it is being 
infringed.65  Sometimes, that notice comes in the form of the complaint.  Oftentimes, 
however, it might come in the form of a cease and desist letter to the would-be defendant, 
or in a letter offering to license the patent in a way that ostensibly seeks to avoid giving 
rise to jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act’s requirement of an “actual 
controversy.”66  When a case arises under patent law, courts apply the substantive law of 
the Federal Circuit.67  Notably, the Federal Circuit in 2005 had made it more difficult to 
establish an actual controversy by demanding that the declaratory judgment plaintiff 
“demonstrate that it has a reasonable apprehension of imminent suit.”68  Although the 
                                                 
61 An innocent end user who purchases infringing product from the patent owner under certain 
circumstances might be immune from suit under the “first sale/exhaustion” doctrine.  Monsanto Co. v. 
Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1335-36 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  For a thoughtful analysis of the “first sale/exhaustion” 
doctrine, see generally John W. Osborne, A Coherent View of Patent Exhaustion: A Standard Based on 
Patentable Distinctiveness, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 643 (2004).   
62 “[I]ntent is not an element of direct infringement, whether literal or by equivalents . . . . Infringement is, 
and should remain, a strict liability offense.”  Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 
1512, 1527 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc).  Indeed, patent law in this respect is comparable to copyright law, 
where innocent infringement is no defense to liability, although it may be relevant to willfulness.  See 
Christopher A. Harkins, Tattoos and Copyright Infringement: Celebrities, Marketers, and Businesses 
Beware of the Ink, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 313, 314 & n.2 (2006). 
63 Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“There continues 
to be ‘an affirmative duty of due care to avoid infringement of the known patent rights of others.’”) 
(citation omitted).    
64 Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
65 nCube Corp. v. Seachange Int’l, Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
66 Federal jurisdiction is limited to cases of “actual controversy.”  28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006) (Declaratory 
Judgment Act requires “a case of actual controversy”); Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 
43, 67 (1997).  This requirement, which the Declaratory Judgment Act explicitly acknowledges, has its 
roots in Article III of the Constitution.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.   
67 Vanguard Research, Inc. v. PEAT, Inc., 304 F.3d 1249, 1254 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
68 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  Until recently (March 26, 
2007, to be precise), in patent cases the Federal Circuit had held that courts were to apply a two-part test to 
determine whether there is an actual controversy in suits requesting a declaration of patent non-
infringement or invalidity.  Id. at 1330 (the two-part test mandated “both (1) an explicit threat or other 
action by the patentee which creates a reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory judgment 
plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit, and (2) present activity by the declaratory judgment plaintiff 
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Supreme Court in its 2007 decision in Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.69 found there 
to be an actual controversy based on a letter that made a clear threat to enforce a newly 
issued patent and the belief that the patent covered the licensee’s product,70 the Supreme 
Court signaled that the Federal Circuit’s heightened test had a limited future life 
expectancy.  In footnote 11 to the Medimmune decision, the Supreme Court strongly 
hinted that it was calling into question the continued viability of “the Federal Circuit’s 
‘reasonable apprehension of suit’ test (or in its evolved form, the ‘reasonable 
apprehension of imminent suit test [of Teva]).”71  The impact of footnote 11 from 
Medimmune would likely make district courts reluctant to employ the Federal Circuit’s 
“reasonable apprehension of imminent suit” test in patent declaratory judgment actions.  
Stated another way, declaratory judgment plaintiffs would be more likely to overcome a 
motion to dismiss72 that tests the federal subject matter jurisdiction of a patent declaratory 
judgment complaint.  If there was any doubt as to the impact footnote 11 might have, the 
Federal Circuit removed all doubt on March 26, 2007 when it put the reasonable 
apprehension of suit test to rest.73 
¶33 Any safe haven once afforded to patentees, who could engage in scare-and-run 
tactics of threatening a patent infringement suit and expensive litigation under the guise 
of offering a patent license with a so-called promise not to sue in order to avoid creating 
declaratory judgment jurisdiction, was dealt a fatal blow by the Federal Circuit’s recent 
decision in SanDisk Corporation v. STMicroelectronics, Inc.74  The district court had 
found that SanDisk lacked a reasonable apprehension of being sued by ST for patent 
infringement given ST’s statement that it “has absolutely no plan whatsoever to sue 
SanDisk”75 and ST’s failure to make “express charges of infringement carrying with them 
the threat of enforcement.”76  In view of footnote 11 of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
                                                                                                                                                 
which could constitute infringement, or concrete steps taken by the declaratory judgment plaintiff with the 
intent to conduct such activity.”); Windsurfing Int’l, Inc. v. AMF, Inc., 828 F.2d 755, 757 (Fed. Cir. 1987) 
(setting forth a similar two-part test of when there would be an actual controversy); Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 
531 F.2d 585, 592 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that the presentation of defenses cannot bestow the 
independent jurisdiction necessary to create “case of actual controversy” within the meaning of the 
Declaratory Judgment Act).   
69 Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764 (2007). 
70 Id.  In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court examined in some modest detail its declaratory judgment 
jurisprudence. 
71 Medimmune, 127 S. Ct. at 774 n.11.   
72 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).  Consequently, to the extent that a defendant’s motion to dismiss is based on the 
argument that a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a patent declaratory judgment action on account 
of there being no actual controversy, the defendant’s motion will have a lesser chance of success at the 
pleading stage.  Medimmune, 127 S. Ct. at 771 (“[T]he facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that 
there is a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy 
and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”).   
73 SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., No. 05-1300, 2007 WL 881008, at *6 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 26, 
2007) (“The Supreme Court, in MedImmune, addressed the ‘reasonable apprehension of suit’ aspect of this 
court’s two-part test and concluded that it conflicts [with the case or controversy principle that is rooted in 
Article III of the Constitution].”); see also Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., No. 06-
1181, 2007 WL 942201, at *12 (Fed. Cir. Mar. 30, 2007) (Friedman, J., concurring) (“Although these 
footnote statements were dicta, the Court apparently was telling us that it rejected our ‘reasonable 
apprehension of imminent suit’ test for determining declaratory judgment in patent cases . . . .”).    
74 SanDisk, 2007 WL 881008, at *9. 
75 Id. at *2. 
76 Id. at *3 (internal brackets omitted). 
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MedImmune, the Federal Circuit scrapped the reasonable apprehension of suit prong77 in 
favor of an adverse positions test: “We hold only that where a patentee asserts rights 
under a patent based on certain identified ongoing or planned activity of another party, 
and where that party contends that it has the right to engage in the accused activity 
without license, an Article III case or controversy will arise and the party need not risk a 
suit for infringement by engaging in the identified activity before seeking a declaration of 
its legal rights.”78  Before the ink was dry on the SanDisk decision, another panel of the 
Federal Circuit, in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp., 
reaffirmed that its reasonable apprehension test had been overruled.79  The Novartis 
decision further shaped the adverse positions test by emphasizing an “all circumstances” 
analysis as the standard by which the adverse legal interests ought to be weighed in 
determining whether there was sufficient evidence of standing and ripeness to make the 
controversy justiciable under Article III of the Constitution.80 
¶34 To the extent that the test in patent declaratory judgment actions is a moving 
current, under a state of flux and to undergo further morphing until there in an en banc 
decision, the present flow of current may have been reflected in the concurring opinion in 
SanDisk by Judge Bryson, who expressed reservations about the new standard.  
According to Judge Bryson, “virtually any invitation to take a paid license relating to the 
prospective licensee’s activities would give rise to an Article III case or controversy if the 
prospective licensee elects to assert that its conduct does not fall within the scope of the 
patent.”81  Therefore, unless circumscribed to facts where a patentee identifies specific 
products or activities by the would-be licensee together with specifying particular patent 
claims and an explanation of how those claims cover the accused products or activities, 
the adverse positions test will usher in sweeping changes to declaratory judgment actions 
involving patents.  As a result, an unbounded adverse positions test has the potential of 
making declaratory relief virtually limitless in its availability to parties who are merely 
approached by patentees seeking to license their patents.82   
                                                 
77 The court in SanDisk expressly avoided the second prong of the Federal Circuit’s declaratory judgment 
test for patent infringement actions: “In this case, we address only the first prong of this court’s two-part 
test.  There is no dispute that the second prong is met.  We therefore leave to another day the effect of 
MedImmune, if any, on the second prong.”  SanDisk, 2007 WL 881008, at *7 n.2.   
78 Id. at *7.  The court suggested that a patentee can avoid the risk of a declaratory judgment action by 
entering into a confidentiality agreement with the prospective licensee, instead of simply marking any 
documents exchanged between the parties as protected under Federal Rule of Evidence 408 relating to the 
restriction on use of offers to settle a claim.  Id. at *2 n.1.  In practice, parties often enter into confidential 
non-disclosure agreements when the parties consider exploring patent licensing as being in their mutual 
interest.  When negotiations do not start with such a friendly handshake, the parties in practice usually 
endorse their documents “Under Fed. R. Evid. 408,” as when negotiations begin with the cease and desist 
letter or similar communication by which the patentee in essence hints at or otherwise overtly threatens to 
commence a consuming and costly patent infringement litigation unless the prospective licensee enters into 
a license.   
79 Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharms. Corp., No. 06-1181, 2007 WL 942201, at *12 (Fed. Cir. 
Mar. 30, 2007). 
80 Id. at *3, *11. 
81 Id. at *11.  
82 The Federal Circuit and Supreme Court were attempting to address the problem with the reasonable 
apprehension test where the would-be licensee is faced with a decision of betting the farm in the face of 
threatened patent infringement charges and risking treble damages by continuing with its current or planned 
activities on the one hand, or effectively being coerced to abandon its otherwise lawful activities by giving 
up what it had a right to do and thereby through its own action (or inaction) eliminating the imminent threat 
or reasonable apprehension of suit.  Id. at *5-9.  While stating that it “need not define the outer boundaries 
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¶35 At a minimum, whatever circumstances satisfy the Federal Circuit’s lower 
standard for finding patent declaratory judgment jurisdiction will in turn directly impact 
the advice of counsel defense.  Put differently, the court’s standard would necessarily 
trigger a would-be defendant’s duty to exercise due care and to investigate whether or not 
the product infringes any valid, enforceable claim of the patent.83 
¶36 The “actual notice” of another’s patent is arguably a still lower standard, however, 
than the “actual controversy” requirement for Declaratory Judgment Action.  Stated 
another way, an affirmative duty to investigate another’s patent might arise even when 
the patent owner has not asserted the patent against the would-be infringer.  Indeed, at 
least one court held that notice had occurred when in-house counsel saw a patent that had 
been referenced in the Official Gazette of the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office.84  While the defendant argued that it did not recognize the infringement issue, the 
Federal Circuit gave weight to the fact that in-house counsel associated the patent with 
the accused product in the capacity as counsel for the potential infringer.85  One district 
court had found the potential infringer to be on notice, however, when the asserted patent 
appeared among prior art references cited by the defendant in its own patent 
applications,86 even though the defendant’s patents had no direct relationship with the 
allegedly infringing product.87  That district court rejected the defendant’s argument that 
actual notice “requires both knowledge of the patents and knowledge of a problem of 
infringement.”88  These cases seem to be wrongly decided to the extent they convert the 
standard of what the potential infringer “had known” into a standard more resembling 
what the defendant “should have known,” especially given Federal Circuit precedent that 
“constructive notice” is not tantamount to actual notice and shall not trigger the duty of 
care.89 
                                                                                                                                                 
of declaratory judgment jurisdiction, which will depend on the application of the principles of declaratory 
judgment jurisdiction to the facts and circumstances of each case,” id. at *7, the Federal Circuit cited many 
cases in contexts outside of patent licensing that should provide guidance for district courts in applying the 
adverse positions test.  Id. at *8.  Specifically, courts will be called on to decide whether the patentee has 
taken a position that, when juxtaposed against a prospective licensee’s asserted rights, informs the court 
that the parties have adverse legal interests of sufficient immediacy and reality in view of specific identified 
ongoing or planned activity so as to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.   
83 SRI Int’l v. Advanced Tech. Labs., 127 F.3d 1462, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (noting that, in the context of 
damages, the criteria for filing a declaratory judgment action is not coextensive with the criteria for actual 
notice, which is lower and may be proven without creating an actual controversy under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act). 
84 Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 96 F.3d 1409, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
85 Id. at 1415-16.   
86 Patent applicants are under a duty of candor and good faith, when prosecuting the patent application 
before the US Patent and Trademark Office, and thereby encouraged to cite prior art “known” to the 
applicant.  37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2000).  Prior art is cited in a document known as an “information disclosure 
statement” (IDS), but the IDS “shall not be construed to be an admission that the information cited in the 
statement is, or is considered to be, material to the patentability as defined in § 1.56(b).”  37 C.F.R. 
§ 1.98(h) (2000).   
87 Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1037-38 (D. Del. 2001). 
88 Id. at 1037 (the court found notice was sufficient to send the issue to the jury, because there was a 
memorandum in the defendant’s files making reference of the patent in order to cite that patent to the PTO 
in one application that in-house counsel was prosecuting). 
89 Imonex Servs., Inc., v. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GMBH, 408 F.3d 1374, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(“Constructive notice, as by marking a product with a patent number, is insufficient to trigger this duty.”); 
but see Christopher A. Harkins, A Budding Theory of Willful Patent Infringement: Orange Books, Colored 
Pills, and Greener Verdicts, 2007 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (introducing a theory 
whereby the Food and Drug Administration’s “Orange Book,” which is published pursuant the Hatch-
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¶37 Also, any lowering of the standard of actual knowledge is especially problematic 
given that the potential infringer’s duty arguably may be triggered by notice received by 
any corporate employee, including engineers.90  Moreover, imputing any corporate 
employee’s knowledge of the patent to the corporation itself would encourage a policy of 
corporate ignorance in order to avoid the notice requirement of willful infringement and 
thereby “impede rather than ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,’ the 
constitutional objective of patent and copyright protection.”91   
2. The Totality of Circumstances Test of Willfulness 
¶38 Even when the accused had knowledge of the asserted patent, willful infringement 
does not lie based on “the simple fact of infringement.”92  Rather, a finding of actual 
infringement is necessary but not sufficient for willfulness, which is a question of fact.93   
¶39 To establish willful infringement, the Federal Circuit has adopted a two-part test.  
The first step asks the fact finder to consider the “totality of circumstances”94 in making 
its determination of whether the plaintiff met its burden of proving willfulness, which 
totality of circumstances include the following non-exclusive factors:   
(1) whether the infringer deliberately copied the ideas or design of 
another; (2) whether the infringer, when he knew of the other’s patent 
protection, investigated the scope of the patent and formed a good-faith 
belief that it was invalid or that it was not infringed; . . . (3) the infringer’s 
behavior as a party to the litigation; (4) defendant’s size and financial 
condition; (5) closeness of the case; (6) duration of defendant’s 
misconduct; (7) remedial action by the defendant; (8) defendant’s 
motivation for harm; and (9) whether defendant attempted to conceal its 
misconduct.95  
                                                                                                                                                 
Waxman Act, would provide actual notice to a defendant who produces a generic version of a brand-name 
patented drug). 
90 SRI Int’l v. Advanced Tech. Labs., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding that the potential 
infringer had actual notice of the asserted patent when it employed “engineers [who had] expressed their 
concerns” over the patent in a memorandum).   
91 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 126 S. Ct. 2921, 2922 (2006) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (Dissenting to the Supreme Court’s per curiam opinion dismissing a writ of certiorari as 
improvidently granted); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“to promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their Respective 
Writings and Discoveries”); Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (The patent system 
represents a “bargain that encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of new and useful 
advances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time.”).  
92 Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“There is no evidentiary 
presumption that every infringement is willful.”). 
93 Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
94 Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 449 F.3d 1209, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Fuji Photo Film 
Co. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Comark Commc’ns., Inc. v. Harris Corp., 
156 F.3d 1182, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“In determining whether willfulness has been shown, we look to the 
totality of circumstances, understanding that willfulness, ‘as in life, is not an all-or-nothing trait, but one of 
degree.  It recognizes that infringement may range from unknowing, or accidental, to deliberate, or 
reckless, disregard of the patentee’s legal rights.’”(citation omitted)).   
95 Liquid Dynamics, 449 F.3d at 1225 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).   
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¶40 If the plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence96 that the defendant did 
not meet this duty of due care, then a jury may find that the infringement was willful.  
The plaintiff bears both burdens of persuasion and production.97  The burden of 
production shifts to the accused to put on evidence that it acted with due care only after 
the plaintiff meets its initial burden of production.98  An express finding of willfulness is 
necessary before the second step.99   
¶41 In the second step, the court may exercise its discretion in determining whether to 
increase the damage award based on the jury’s finding of willfulness.100  A jury’s finding 
that the defendant willfully infringed the patent merely authorizes – it does not mandate – 
treble damages and attorneys’ fees,101 “even when there is an express finding of willful 
infringement.”102  The paramount determination in deciding to grant enhancement and the 
amount of those enhanced damages is the defendant’s culpable conduct or bad faith.103   
¶42 Indeed, the failure of the infringer to avoid infringement by not attempting to 
design around the patent, or by otherwise failing to take remedial measures, may justify 
enhanced damages.104  Another important factor in determining whether a potential 
infringer lacked a good faith belief that it did not infringe a patent is whether or not the 
infringer obtained an opinion of counsel, as discussed next.105   
3. Look Before You Leap, and other Lessons for an Opinion of Counsel  
¶43 Oftentimes, a defendant to a patent infringement lawsuit expects to rely on the 
advice of counsel in order to avoid a finding of willful infringement.  That opinion can 
                                                 
96 nCube Corp. v. Seachange Int’l, Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“A jury verdict of 
willfulness requires a finding ‘by clear and convincing evidence in view of the totality of the circumstances 
that [the defendant] acted in disregard of the . . . patent and lacked a reasonable basis for believing it had a 
right to do what it did.’”(citation omitted)); see also Liquid Dynamics 449 F.3d at 1225. 
97 Comark Commc’ns., 156 F.3d at 1190. 
98 Norian Corp. v. Stryker Corp., 363 F.3d 1321, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[A]bsent an initial presentation of 
evidence . . . this burden of coming forward in defense [does] not arise.”). 
99 Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 407 F.3d 1297, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 2005).  An express finding of 
willful infringement is necessary before the court awards enhanced damages.  Id.  When the court exercises 
its discretion in denying willfulness damages, it must explain why.  Id.  
100 Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Any trebling of 
damages based on a finding of willfulness is reviewed for abuse of discretion.”); Amsted Indus. Inc. v. 
Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 183 (Fed.Cir.1994) (“[T]he district court did not abuse its 
discretion in trebling [the patentee’s damages] because, inter alia, the infringer deliberately copied the 
patented invention, the jury found willful infringement, and the infringer lacked a good faith belief the 
patent was invalid.”). 
101 Group One, 407 F.3d at 1309 (“On a jury finding of willful patent infringement, a court may award 
attorney fees and not enhanced damages, or vice versa.”). 
102 Id. at 1308.  When the court exercises its discretion in denying willfulness damages, it must explain 
why.  Id.  
103 Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughan Co., 449 F.3d 1209, 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Courts consider [the 
totality of circumstances] when determining whether an infringer has acted in bad faith.”); see also Jurgens 
v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Read Corp. v. Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 826 (Fed. Cir. 
1992); Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing & Lithography Co., 923 F.2d 1576, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 
1991).  For example, using the “copying” factor as an example, the fact finder need not find “slavish 
copying,”  Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 96 F.3d at 1414, if copying the ideas or design 
was made “deliberately.”  Read, 970 F.2d at 827 n.7 (Stating that the test is “whether the infringer 
deliberately copied the ideas or design of another.”). 
104 Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
105 Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
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take the form of a non-infringement opinion or an invalidity opinion.106  But before 
expecting to parade the opinion in front of the jury to vitiate willfulness and to show a 
good faith belief that it did not infringe the patent or that the patent was invalid, the 
defendant must show that the belief in the opinion was reasonable under all the 
circumstances.107   
¶44 Indeed, willfulness may still be found despite the presence of an opinion of 
counsel in those cases when it is shown that the opinion was “either ignored or found to 
be incompetent.”108  It must be incompetent in at least two respects. 
¶45 First, the opinion must be given by a “competent” attorney.  The Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct promulgated by the American Bar Association and followed in 
some version by forty-seven states109 requires that the lawyer possess the required “legal 
knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation.”110  The attorney ought to be registered to practice111 before the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office.112   
¶46 Second, the opinion itself must be independent and competent.113  Generally, this 
requires that the opining attorney has analyzed the patent, its prosecution history, relevant 
prior art, and the accused product.114  Indeed, an oral opinion given without analyzing the 
accused device, the patent’s file wrapper, or any prior art may not be relied upon to show 
                                                 
106 An invalid claim cannot be infringed.  Abbott Labs. v. Baxter Pharm. Prods., Inc., 471 F.3d 1363, 1369 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (“Since all asserted claims are invalid, we do not reach questions of infringement or 
inequitable conduct.”).   
107 Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 181 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
108 Comark Commc’ns., Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1191 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Read, 970 F.2d at 829. 
109 THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, 2007 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY 165-67 (2006) (The District of Columbia and forty-seven states have enacted some version 
of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  Only Maine, New York, and Ohio follow the ABA’s 
Model Code of Professional Responsibility.). 
110 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (1983). 
111 Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed.Cir.1983) (“M-K knew 
or should have known that . . . [appellant’s attorney] . . . was not a patent attorney.  Again, this fact alone is 
not controlling, but does bear on the question whether M-K, when it sought advice, did so in good faith.”), 
overruled by Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 
(Fed.Cir.2004) (en banc)). 
112 Registered patent attorneys have passed a registration examination to establish to the Director of the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office that they possess the requisite legal, scientific, and technical 
qualifications, knowledge, and competence in the patent laws and procedures of the Patent Office to present 
and prosecute applications before the Office.  37 C.F.R. § 11.7(a)(2), (b)(1)(i). 
113 Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1390 (“Although M-K might have demonstrated to the district court 
that despite any inference arising from these circumstances, it was in fact justified in believing [the opining 
attorney] was capable of rendering an independent and competent opinion because he did take the steps 
normally considered to be necessary and proper in preparing an opinion, it failed to do so.”); see also 
Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Masimo Corp., 147 Fed. App’x. 158, 184, Nos. 04-1495, 04-1540, 2005 WL 2139867, 
at *26 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 7, 2005) (“Any competent attorney registered to practice before the PTO should 
have known that the Masimo I litigation was material.”) (pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6, the Federal Circuit’s 
Order was non-precedential but is intended to be part of the public record); Yeu v. Kim, Nos. 91-1034, 91-
1035, 1991 WL 142608, at *4 (Fed. Cir. July 31, 1991) (“Our cases establish that good-faith reliance on 
competent advice of counsel is a defense to a charge of willful infringement.”) (emphasis in original) 
(designated pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6).  According to the Federal Circuit Rules, an order designated 
non-precedential was “determined by the panel issuing it as not adding significantly to the body of law.”  
FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b) (2006).  The Federal Circuit’s precedential and nonprecedential opinions, rules, and 
other information are also available on the Federal Circuit web site.  See United States Court of Appeals for 
the Federal Circuit, Rules and Forms, http://www.fedcir.gov/contents.html (last visited Apr. 6, 2007).  
114 Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1390.   
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a good faith belief in non-infringement.115  Moreover, the potential infringer must be sure 
to give its opining counsel all of the important technical documents and the best 
information available or else “the opinion can no longer serve its prophylactic purpose of 
negating a finding of willful infringement.”116    
¶47 Until 2004, a plaintiff’s burden of production was satisfied by a defendant’s 
assertion of the attorney-client privilege to withhold an opinion of counsel.  
Consequently, the jury received an instruction allowing it to infer that the defendant 
either did not seek an opinion of counsel (thereby failing to exercise due care) or that the 
opinion was incompetent or unfavorable.  Either way, the jury could find that the 
defendant did not hold a reasonable, good-faith belief that it did not infringe the patent.  
In Knorr-Bremse, the Federal Circuit held that “[t]he adverse inference that an opinion 
was or would have been unfavorable, flowing from the infringer's failure to obtain or 
produce an exculpatory opinion of counsel, is no longer warranted.”117   
¶48 Therefore, when the opinion is open to attack, such as by challenging or 
discrediting it as a mere oral opinion or a conclusory written opinion that did not review 
the best information available and all documents that a reasonable opining attorney can 
be expected to rely upon in forming the opinion, then according to one Federal Circuit 
decision it might be better strategy to assert the attorney-client privilege and forsake the 
advice-of-counsel defense.118  Because there is no longer an adverse inference that a legal 
opinion was or would have been unfavorable when the defendant invokes the attorney-
client and/or work-product privileges,119 nor an adverse inference from such defendant’s 
failure to consult with counsel,120 the defendant effectively keeps the plaintiff from using 
an otherwise shaky opinion against the defendant by invoking these privileges.  
Otherwise, the incompetent opinions, taken together with other evidence under the 
totality of circumstances, might support the finding of willfulness.121    
                                                 
115 Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1365-69 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Because the 
opining attorney did not timely possess and analyze the accused device, the file wrapper, or any prior art in 
rendering oral opinions, the legal infirmities of the competence of those opinions were relevant in deciding 
that the infringement was willful). 
116 nCube Corp. v. Seachange Int’l, Inc., 436 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
117 Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(en banc); see also Imonex Servs., Inc. v. W.H. Munzprufer Dietmar Trenner GMBH, 408 F.3d 1374, 1378 
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (“In that case, the affirmative duty of due care to avoid infringement was reiterated, but it 
was found no longer appropriate to draw an adverse inference with respect to willful infringement from 
failure to obtain legal advice.” (citing Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1345-46)); Insituform Techs., Inc. v. 
CAT Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“‘[T]he failure to obtain an exculpatory 
opinion of counsel shall no longer provide an adverse inference or presumption that such an opinion would 
have been unfavorable.’” (quoting Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1346)). 
118 Golden Blount, 438 F.3d at 1367-69. 
119 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1344 (“When the attorney-client privilege and/or work-product privilege is 
invoked by a defendant in an infringement suit, is it appropriate for the trier of fact to draw an adverse 
inference with respect to willful infringement?  The answer is ‘no.’ . . . [N]o adverse inference shall arise 
from invocation of the attorney-client and/or work-product privilege.”).  
120 Id. at 1345 (“When the defendant had not obtained legal advice, is it appropriate to draw an adverse 
inference with respect to willful infringement?  The answer, again, is ‘no.’”). 
121 Golden Blount, 438 F.3d at 1368 (“On the other hand, if the privilege is not asserted, the patentee in 
making its threshold showing of culpable conduct is free to introduce as evidence whatever opinions were 
obtained and to challenge the competence of those opinions in satisfaction of the patentee’s burden on 
willfulness.   Nothing in Knorr-Bremse precludes a patentee from attempting to make such a showing.”). 
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4. Treble Damages and Attorneys’ Fees 
¶49 When the defendant both knows of the patent and fails to carry out its duty of care 
by avoiding the infringement of a valid and enforceable patent, then there might be a 
verdict of willful infringement.  As a result, the plaintiff may be entitled to treble 
damages122 as well as its attorneys’ fees.123  And those attorneys’ fees in patent litigation 
can really sting.124   
¶50 The trebling is of all actual damages.  By statute, a plaintiff may recover only 
actual damages accruing after the date it placed the alleged infringer on “notice of 
infringement.”125  Here, the notice for purposes of willfulness and the notice for actual 
damages deviate.   
¶51 Willfulness is a more lenient notice and focuses on when the potential infringer 
had knowledge of the patent, while the purpose of the notice statute for actual damages 
focuses on the patentee and is designed to ensure that the plaintiff gave the defendant 
knowledge of the adverse patent and alleged infringement.126  Consequently, for actual 
damages to accrue, mere “notice of the patent’s existence or ownership” is not “notice of 
infringement” and is not an “affirmative communication [to the potential infringer] of a 
specific charge of infringement by a specific accused product or device.”127  The plaintiff 
may meet its burden by giving the potential defendant “constructive” notice,128 as when 
the plaintiff and its licensees mark with the patent number substantially all products 
covered by the patent.129  Absent marking, however, actual damages may be recovered 
                                                 
122 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (A “court may increase the damages up to three times the amount found or 
assessed.”). 
123 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2006) (“The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the 
prevailing party.”). 
124 For an analysis of the rising costs of patent litigation, see Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off Paper 
Patents and Patent Trolls: A Novel “Cold Fusion” Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17 ALB. 
L.J. SCI. & TECH. (forthcoming 2007) (attorneys’ fees could top $650 thousand when plaintiff claims up to 
$1 million at the disposition of the case while those fees could top $2 million and even top $4.5 million 
when the damages at issue are in excess of $1 million and $25 million respectively); see also AIPLA, 
REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 22-23 (2005).   
125 See, e.g., Am. Med. Sys. v. Med. Eng’g Corp., 6 F.3d 1523, 1537 n.18 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“Section 287(a) 
requires a party asserting infringement to either provide constructive notice (through marking) or actual 
notice in order to avail itself of damages.  The notice of infringement must therefore come from the 
patentee, not the infringer.”); see also Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 187 
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (“For purposes of section 287(a), notice must be of ‘the infringement,’ not merely notice 
of the patent’s existence or ownership.”); 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006) (“In the event of failure so to mark, no 
damages shall be recovered by the patentee in any action for infringement, except on proof that the 
infringer was notified of the infringement and continues to infringe thereafter, in which event damages may 
be recovered only for infringement occurring after such notice.  Filing of an action for infringement shall 
constitute such notice.”). 
126 Gart v. Logitech, Inc., 254 F.3d 1334, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Amsted Indus. Inc., 24 F.3d at 187 
(“The correct approach to determining notice under section 287 must focus on the action of the patentee, 
not the knowledge of the infringer.”). 
127 Amsted Indus., 24 F.3d at 187.   
128 Harkins, supra note 89 (arguing that the Food and Drug Administration’s “Orange Book,” which is 
published pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman Act, serves the purpose of notifying potential infringers who 
produce generic versions of brand-name patented drugs). 
129 Syngenta Seeds, Inc. v. Delta Cotton Coop., Inc., 457 F.3d 1269, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“This court has 
held that, in order to recover damages for patent infringement, a patentee bears the burden of pleading and 
proving either actual or constructive notice that the article is patented.”); Sentry Prot. Prods., Inc. v. Eagle 
Mfg. Co., 400 F.3d 910, 918 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“Constructive notice is provided when the patentee 
consistently marks substantially all of its patented products.”) (citation, internal quotations, and brackets 
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only after actual notice is given by the plaintiff130 to the defendant, such as with the filing 
of the lawsuit or with a letter that accuses the defendant’s product of infringing the 
plaintiff’s patent.131   
¶52 For its actual damages, the plaintiff may seek to recover lost profit damages, 
which are the profits the plaintiff lost because of the infringement.132  Lost profit damages 
are not based on defendant’s profits but instead are based on the profits the plaintiff 
would have realized if the defendant had not taken away those sales with the infringing 
product.133  The plaintiff must show that it would have made the sales “but for” the 
defendant’s infringing product.134  Moreover, the lost profits test mandates proof of 
demand for the product, ability to manufacture and market to the demand, the absence of 
non-infringing alternatives, and the profit it would have made on the lost sales.135  In lieu 
of the greater standard of proving lost profits, the Patent Act guarantees the patent owner 
(even if it never commercializes a single product) a minimum royalty on all of 
defendant’s sales.136  The plaintiff need not even prove an established royalty (i.e., where 
the value of a patent had been set through a series of existing licenses), and may in that 
case still recover a reasonable royalty from the defendant if the royalty means that the 
defendant would be selling the product at a significant loss.137  
                                                                                                                                                 
omitted); Gart, 254 F.3d at 1345 (“The statute permits either constructive notice, which is accomplished by 
marking the article with the patent number, or actual notice.”); SRI Int’l v. Advanced Tech. Labs., 127 F.3d 
1462, 1469-70 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Section 287(a) relates to informing the interested public of the patent 
status of an article in commerce, and permits either constructive notice by marking the article with the 
patent number, or actual notice to the infringer.”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 287(a) (2006) (“Patentees, and 
persons making, offering for sale, or selling within the United States any patented article for or under them 
or importing any patented article into the United States, may give notice to the public that the same is 
patented, either by fixing thereon the word ‘patent’ or the abbreviation ‘pat.,’ together with the number of 
the patent, or when, from the character of the article, this cannot be done, by fixing to it, or to the package 
wherein on or more of them is contained, a label containing a like notice.”).  
130 Lans v. Digital Equip. Corp., 252 F.3d 1320, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“[N]otice from someone close to 
the patentee does not satisfy [section] 287(a)”).  
131 SRI Int’l., 127 F.3d at 1469-70.  “Actual notice may be achieved without creating a case of actual 
controversy in terms of 28 U.S.C. § 2201. . . .[such as] when the recipient is informed of the identity of the 
patent and the activity that is believed to be an infringement, accompanied by a proposal to abate the 
infringement, whether by license . . . [or by a demand for] cessation of activity.”  Id. at 1470. 
132 Zygo Corp. v. Wyko Corp., 79 F.3d 1563, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 
1538, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc); State Indus. Inc. v. Mor-Flo Indus., Inc., 883 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 
(Fed. Cir. 1989); Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1156 (6th Cir. 1978). 
133 In order to establish lost profits as the measure of damages, a plaintiff must prove by a “reasonable 
probability” that, “but for” the infringement, the plaintiff “would have made the sales that were made by 
the infringer.” Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(citation omitted).   
134 Crystal Semiconductor v. Tritech Microelectronics, 246 F.3d 1336, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Grain 
Processing Corp. v. Am. Maize-Prods., 185 F.3d 1341, 1349-50 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
135 Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1545. The plaintiff may rely on the following factors to prove entitlement to lost 
profits damages: (1) demand for the patented product; (2) absence of acceptable non-infringing substitutes; 
(3) manufacturing and marketing capacity to exploit the demand; and (4) the amount of profit it would have 
made.  Id. (citing Panduit, 575 F.2d at 1156). 
136 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (establishing that compensation for infringement can be “in no event less than a 
reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as 
fixed by the court.”); Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1544 (interpreting the statutory mandate that a damage award 
shall be “in no event less than a reasonable royalty” as setting “a floor below which damage awards may 
not fall”). 
137 Applied Med. Res. Corp. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 435 F.3d 1356, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (arriving at 
reasonable royalties in the absence of an established royalty); Golight, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 355 
F.3d 1327, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (rejecting Wal-Mart’s contention that the reasonable royalty should not be 
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III. A HOBSON’S CHOICE AND THE ADVICE OF COUNSEL DEFENSE 
¶53 The intersection of a defendant’s right to rely on the advice of counsel defense 
and the plaintiff’s right to all discovery relating to that defense is in a critical state of flux.  
On the one hand, by offering up the opinion of counsel, the defendant might successfully 
defend against the charges of willful infringement and avoid the treble damages and 
attorneys’ fees that might follow a finding of willfulness.  On the other hand, by offering 
up the opinion, the defendant waives any attorney-client privileged communications 
concerning the opinion,138 and the Federal Circuit held in 2006 that the defendant may 
also relinquish attorney work product.139  But the bad news for defendants does not end 
there.  At least one court has held that the defendant might have to give up its trial 
counsel.140 
A. From Knorr-Bremse to EchoStar and Beyond 
¶54 Until 2004, the Federal Circuit’s precedent on proving willful infringement had 
aided the plaintiff in making its case on willfulness by permitting the trier of fact to infer 
from an alleged infringer’s failure to produce an opinion letter that such an opinion, if 
rendered, was or would have been unfavorable to the alleged infringer.141  In its 2004 
Knorr-Bremse decision, the Federal Circuit specifically addressed the question of 
whether it is appropriate to draw an adverse inference with respect to willfulness when an 
accused infringer had not obtained legal advice.142  The court answered that question in 
the negative.143  In that case, while early receipt of legal advice would have strengthened 
                                                                                                                                                 
so high as to mean the defendant sells the product at a significant loss).  Arguably, a court could disregard 
an established royalty if the defendant demonstrates that such royalties were inflated, such as in a case 
where the royalty rate in those preexisting licenses reflected more that of business decisions in avoiding the 
expenses of litigation as opposed to being indicative of the true value of what had been licensed. 
138 Verizon Cal., Inc. v. Ronald A. Katz Tech. Licensing, L.P., 266 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1148-49 (C.D. Cal. 
2003) (holding that both the attorney-client privilege and attorney work product were waived for “the entire 
course of the alleged infringement,” namely, “all points of time, including up through trial.”); Novartis 
Pharms. Corp. v. Eon Labs. Mfg., Inc., 206 F.R.D. 396, 399 (D. Del. 2002) (compelling the accused 
infringer to produce “all legal advice it received from any member of the Cohen, Pontani law firm with 
regard to the subject matter of Pontani’s opinion” because the accused infringer “elected to engage in the 
unconventional and risky practice of having opinion and trial counsel from the same law firm.”). 
139 The Federal Circuit has found two categories of work product waived when the defendant relies on the 
advice of counsel defense.  In re EchoStar Commc’ns. Corp., 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  First, the 
defendant had waived “documents that embody a communication between the attorney and client 
concerning the subject matter of the case, such as the traditional opinion letter.”  Id. at 1302.  Second, the 
defendant had waived “immunity for any document or opinion that embodies or discusses a communication 
to or from it concerning whether that patent is valid, enforceable, and infringed by the accused.  Id. at 1304 
(noting that this waiver includes “not only any letters, memorandum, conversation, or the like between the 
attorney and his or her client, but also includes, when appropriate, any documents referencing a 
communication between attorney and client.”).  
140 Crossroads Sys. (Tex.), Inc. v. Dot Hill Sys. Corp., No. 03-754, 2006 WL 1544621, at *12 (W.D. Tex. 
May 31, 2006) (granting Plaintiff's Motion to Disqualify Trial Counsel for Dot Hill, and holding that no 
member of trial counsel’s firm may assist in the presentation of this case at trial). 
141 Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en 
banc).   
142 Id. at 1345. 
143 Id. 
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the defendants' argument that they had not willfully infringed, failure to have solicited 
such advice does not give rise to an inference of willfulness.144   
¶55 In other words, there would be no adverse inference drawn against a potential 
infringer who fails to obtain legal advice or who in fact obtains a counsel’s opinion but 
refuses to produce it based on invoking the attorney-client privilege.  Knorr-Bremse does 
not address, however, the scope of the waiver that results from a party waiving privilege 
and asserting the advice of counsel defense.  The starting point in resolving such disputes 
is the Federal Circuit’s recent decision of In re EchoStar.145   
¶56 In 2006, the Federal Circuit addressed, in EchoStar, the documents146 that a 
plaintiff may obtain in discovery that are relevant to the critical inquiry of the defendant’s 
“state of mind”147 at the time of infringement so that there can be a determination of 
whether the defendant has willfully infringed the patent in suit.  To adequately make that 
determination, the Echostar court held that all communications relating to the subject 
matter of the opinion must be disclosed.  In that case, the defendant had produced an 
opinion from in-house counsel, but withheld an opinion from outside counsel on which 
EchoStar chose not to rely.   
¶57 First, the court held that “when EchoStar chose to rely on the advice of in-house 
counsel, it waived the attorney-client privilege with regard to any attorney-client 
communications relating to the same subject matter, including communications with 
counsel other than in-house counsel.”148  The court reasoned that “selective waiver of the 
privilege may lead to the inequitable result that the waiving party could waive its 
privilege for favorable advice while asserting its privilege on unfavorable advice.”149  To 
prevent such abuse, the court held that “when a party defends its action by disclosing an 
attorney-client communication, it waives the attorney-client privilege as to all such 
communications regarding the same subject matter.”150 
¶58 Second, regarding the work-product immunity, the Federal Circuit held that 
reliance on the advice-of-counsel defense resulted in a waiver of (1) documents that 
comprise traditional written communications exchanged between attorney and client 
concerning the subject matter of the opinion, and (2) documents that reflect or 
memorialize any oral communication of work product that the attorney conveyed to the 
client concerning the subject matter of the opinion whether or not those documents were 
forwarded to the client.151  The court held, however, that waiver did not reach attorney 
                                                 
144 Id. at 1345-46.   
145 In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
146 The term “documents” includes “documents that embody a communication,” “documentary 
communications such as opinion letters and memoranda,” and “work-product material” such as “if an 
attorney writes a memorandum or an e-mail to his associate referencing a phone call with the client, in 
which he indicates that he discussed the client’s potential infringement, then such a memorandum is 
discoverable.”  Id. at 1302, 1304.  Presumably, the scope of the term “document” as used by the Federal 
Circuit is coterminous with the scope of the term “document” under Rule 34(a) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a) (“[D]ocuments or electronically stored information – including 
writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound recordings, images, and other data or data 
compilations stored in any medium from which the information can be obtained.”).  
147 “Work-product waiver extends only so far as to inform the court of the infringer’s state of mind.”  In re 
EchoStar, 448 F.3d at 1303.   
148 Id. at 1299. 
149 Id. at 1301. 
150 Id.  
151 Id. at 1302. 
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work-product documents analyzing the law, facts, trial strategy, and so forth that reflect 
the attorney’s mental impressions but that were not communicated to the client, because 
“[i]t is what the alleged infringer knew or believed, and by contradistinction not what 
other items counsel may have prepared but did not communicate to the client, that 
informs the court of an infringer’s willfulness.”152 In arriving at this conclusion, the court 
commented that, “[b]y asserting the advice-of-counsel defense to a charge of willful 
infringement, the accused infringer and his or her attorney do not give their opponent 
unfettered discretion to rummage through all of their files and pillage all of their litigation 
strategies.”153 
¶59 In addition, in discussing the work-product privilege, the Federal Circuit 
addressed the temporal limits to waiver.  Specifically, the court rejected such limits, 
stating that, while it “may be true” that waiver “does not extend to advice and work 
product given after litigation began . . . when the work product is never communicated to 
the client, it is not the case when the advice is relevant to ongoing willful infringement, 
so long as that ongoing infringement is at issue in the litigation.”154  
¶60 The court in EchoStar did not directly address whether the same subject matter 
waiver extends beyond the specific defense at issue to include all defenses.  And, 
predictably, the courts that have reviewed this issue post-EchoStar are split.155  Moreover, 
EchoStar did not involve trial counsel.   
¶61 In the wake of EchoStar, however, some courts have concluded that any EchoStar 
waiver ought to extend to trial counsel, other courts have disagreed, and still others have 
found waiver but only on a limited basis.  In short, courts that have considered the issue 
of waiver with respect to trial counsel have not arrived at any consistent rulings.156   Still, 
                                                 
152 Id. at 1303. 
153 Id.  
154 Id. at 1303 n.4.  
155 See Informatica Corp. v. Bus. Objects Data Integration, Inc., No. C-02-3378, 2006 WL 2329460, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2006) (waiver extends to the opinion which the defendant relies upon); Beck Sys., Inc. 
v. Managesoft Corp., No. 05-C-2036, 2006 WL 2037356, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 14, 2006) (limiting waiver to 
“attorney-client communications and work-product material on the same subject matter as the legal 
opinions on which it relies”); Intex Recreation Corp. v. Team Worldwide Corp., 439 F. Supp. 2d 46, 49 
(D.D.C. 2006) (holding that the subject matter waiver scope is expanded to include all defenses-
infringement, validity, and enforceability); Affinion Net Patents, Inc. v. Maritz, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 2d 354, 
356 (D. Del. 2006) (holding that the advice-of-counsel privilege waiver applied to any defense to 
infringement). 
156 See Computer Assocs. Int’l, Inc. v. Simple.com, Inc., No. C-02-2748, 2006 WL 3050883, at *4 
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 23, 2006) (“holding that the waiver extends to trial counsel is consistent with EchoStar”); 
Autobytel, Inc. v. Dealix Corp., 455 F. Supp. 2d 569, 576 (E.D. Tex. 2006) (finding that plaintiff not 
entitled to discovery of communications and work product between trial counsel and defendant’s 
employees where in-house counsel was mere conduit); Affinion Net Patents, 440 F. Supp. 2d at 356 
(“When a defendant asserts the advice-of-counsel defense, the attorney-client privilege is waived as to 
communications with all counsel related to the same subject matter.”); Ampex Corp. v. Eastman Kodak 
Co., No. C-04-1373, 2006 WL 1995140, at *3 (D. Del. July 17, 2006) (rejecting argument that waiver 
should extend to trial counsel as that would “demolish[ ] the practical significance of the attorney-client 
privilege, a result obviously at odds with other comments in EchoStar”); Beck Sys., 2006 WL 2037356, at 
*5 (“EchoStar did not disturb the approach we adopted in [a previous case] which extends the waiver to 
attorney-client privilege and certain work-product material involving trial counsel.”); Informatica, 2006 
WL 2038461, at *8 (finding that “BODI waived privilege for both pre- and post-filing pertinent attorney-
client communications and work product” and that “it is immaterial whether BODI’s opinion counsel and 
trial counsel are from the same firms, different firms or are even the same person”); Indiana Mills & Mfg., 
Inc. v. Dorel Indus., Inc., No. C-04-01102, 2006 WL 1749413, at *7 (S.D. Ind. May 26, 2006) (“There is 
no indication that the EchoStar court intended to extend this waiver to communication of trial counsel or to 
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others have adopted a “middle ground” approach under which “waiver extends only to 
those trial counsel work-product materials that have been communicated to the client and 
contained conclusions or advice that contradict or cast doubt on the earlier opinions.”157   
B. At a Crossroads Between Choosing Trial Counsel or the Advice of Counsel Defense 
¶62 Underscoring the assault on the effective assistance of trial counsel when a 
defendant dares rely on an advice of counsel defense is the district court decision of 
Crossroads Systems (Texas), Inc. v. Dot Hill Systems Corp.158  In that case, the court 
disqualified the defendant’s trial firm and ordered that no member of the firm “may assist 
in the presentation of this case at trial.”159 
¶63 In Crossroads, some members of the law firm, although not acting as the trial 
team, provided the opinions of counsel that the defendant relied on to defend against a 
charge of willful infringement.  The plaintiff brought a motion to disqualify the 
defendant’s trial law firm.  In granting that motion, the district court relied on ethical 
canons and rules160 that an attorney shall not serve as trial counsel when it becomes clear 
that “he or she will be a necessary witness in the trial of the case.”161  Under the 
circumstances presented to the court, the court extended those canons and rules to the 
entire firm, holding that “a strict prohibition on all members of the testifying lawyer’s 
firm serving as trial counsel is appropriate.”162  The court specifically found that the 
scenario would invite “jury confusion” if the law firm’s trial team “were permitted to 
serve as trial counsel when their partners will be taking the stand as witnesses.”163   
¶64 Moreover, the Crossroads court found the absence of any “prejudice” to the 
defendant based on several factors.  First, the trial attorneys knew, for almost two years, 
that the court would not permit them to act as trial counsel if the opinions of other 
members of the firm were offered in support of the defense to plaintiff’s willfulness 
                                                                                                                                                 
work product of trial counsel.”), withdrawn, No. 1:04-CV-1102-LJM-WTL, 2006 WL 1993420 (S.D. Ind. 
July 14, 2006) (withdrawing opinion because court “had been under the impression that Dorel had never 
sought additional opinions of counsel post-filing”). 
157 Intex Recreation, 439 F. Supp. 2d at 52. 
158 No. 03-754, 2006 WL 1544621 (W.D. Tex. May 31, 2006).  
159 Id. at *11; see also Dynasty Apparel Indus., Inc. v. Rentz, 206 F.R.D. 596, 599 (S.D. Ohio 2001) 
(“[W]hen one lawyer is disqualified under DR 5-101(B), because he will testify as a witness, his entire law 
firm and all other lawyers in it must also be disqualified.”); but see Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-
Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833 RPP, 2000 WL 1006235 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2000) (denying 
plaintiff’s motion to disqualify the accused infringer’s trial attorney and firm because that trial counsel’s 
testimony was irrelevant to the willfulness inquiry when the accused infringer’s management witnesses 
should be the ones who are examined on the accused infringer’s state of mind); Ragdoll Prods. (UK) Ltd. v. 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 2101 DLC, 1999 WL 760209, at *2 (S.D. N.Y. Aug. 26, 1999) (refusing 
to disqualify opinion counsel from assisting the accused infringer with pretrial proceedings, and stating “the 
fact that Mr. Alstadt will be a witness at trial, by itself, is insufficient to require his disqualification” from 
pretrial matters”). 
160 W.D. TEX. R. AT-4; TEX. DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.08(a)-(c) (1989); MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.7(b) (1983); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101, DR 5-
102 (1980).   
161 Crossroads Sys. (Tex.), Inc. v. Dot Hill Sys. Corp., No. 03-754, 2006 WL 1544621 (W.D. Tex. May 31, 
2006) at *9; see also id. at *10. 
162 Id. at *10. 
163 Id. at *11 (According to the court, because it would need to “adopt a set of cumbersome procedures to 
prevent the jury from being unduly influenced by [one law firm] acting in dual roles, each of which may or 
may not be effective, the safer and more appropriate course is to require [that law firm] to refrain from 
participation as trial counsel in this case.”). 
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allegations.164   Second, the trial attorneys assured the court that they would not serve as 
trial counsel for the defendant if the firm’s opining attorneys were called to testify.165  
That the trial counsel later “disavowed” that commitment obviously concerned the court.  
Third, the court relied on the trial counsel’s earlier statement that, in the event the opining 
attorney were called to testify and trial counsel would not participate, the defendant 
would still be “ably represented by several competent attorneys from two law firms 
besides”166 trial counsel, which other firms had been involved with the case for some 
time.   
¶65 On the heels of the disqualification of trial counsel, the case settled soon 
thereafter for over ten million dollars.167   
IV. “A BRIDGE OVER TROUBLED WATER”:168  PROPOSING A COHERENT AND EQUITABLE 
BALANCING TEST  
¶66 Each of the district courts that addressed the issue of whether the waiver should 
extend to trial counsel had read and parsed the same EchoStar decision.  Each considered 
its ruling consistent with EchoStar.  Yet, reading the same opinion and the same exact 
words from the opinion, they came to flatly diverging conclusions of what is and is not 
off limits.  Because the repercussions affect virtually every patent case, a patent 
defendant faces the stark reality of being forced to decide between giving up a critical 
defense to charges of willful infringement or preserving its privilege with trial counsel.   
¶67 Courts, counsel, and parties need a coherent and equitable balancing test that will 
offer them clarity and predictability without compromising equity and fairness to either 
side.  The proposed test weighs the competing policy against selective disclosure of 
opinions of counsel (sword-and-shield litigation tactics) and policy for protecting trial 
counsel’s work product, weighs any prejudice that might befall the accused infringer, 
weighs any irreparable harm to the patentee, and weighs the objective need for the 
evidence.   
                                                 
164 Id. (“Dot Hill has been aware of the Court’s position on this issue since September of 2004, and to the 
extent it has failed to prepare for this eventuality, the responsibility for this failure falls squarely on its 
shoulders.”). 
165 Id. at *9 (“At the time of the hearing, Dot Hill’s counsel took the position that it was possible that none 
of [its] attorneys would be called to testify at the trial, but in the event that they were, [it] would not serve 
as trial counsel since there were two other firms representing Dot Hill.  Since the September 2004 hearing, 
Dot Hill has disavowed its initial statements on the subject.”) (citation to the record omitted). 
166 Id. at *11.   
167 See Press Release, Dot Hill Sys. Corp., Dot Hill Systems Settles Patent Infringement Lawsuit With 
Crossroads Systems (June 28, 2006), http://investors.dothill.com/releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=205287. 
168 PAUL SIMON & ART GARFUNKEL, BRIDGE OVER TROUBLED WATER (Columbia Records 1970). The song 
is the title track to Bridge Over Troubled Water by Paul Simon and Art Garfunkel.  The song is about unity; 
the proposed test is a coherent view that unifies the law on a defendant’s right to the advice of counsel 
defense and a plaintiff’s right to the scope of the ensuing privilege waiver as it applies to trial counsel 
communications.   
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY  [ 2 0 0 7  
 
 234
A. Weighing the Policy Against Sword-and-Shield Opinions of Counsel and the Policy 
for Protecting Attorney Work Product 
¶68 The post-EchoStar district court decisions that interpreted EchoStar to extend the 
waiver to trial counsel had applied what in effect was a bright-line rule or an automatic 
waiver.  That simplistic interpretation of EchoStar sacrifices equity and fairness.    
¶69 Any “bright-line rule” or “automatic waiver” that exposes an accused infringer to 
treble damages and attorneys’ fees aimed at deterrence and retribution while vitiating that 
party’s right to the effective assistance of trial counsel directly conflicts with the 
teachings of Knorr-Bremse,169 EchoStar,170 procedural and substantive due process under 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States,171 the Seventh Amendment172 right to a fair trial, and fundamental fairness.  The 
bright-line approach or automatic waiver has the effect of forcing an accused infringer 
into choosing between the advice of counsel defense to charges of willful infringement 
on the one hand, and effective assistance of trial counsel on the other.  That choice is 
unacceptable.   
¶70 While straightforward in its application, a bright-line rule is rife with potential 
abuses that counter, rather than further, the truth-finding function of patent trials, the goal 
of judicial integrity, and the hope to bring “civil” back to civil litigation.  In the slippery 
slope of an absolute waiver, it is wholly foreseeable (indeed, probable) that, upon a 
defendant’s exercising its right to defend itself based on the advice of counsel, the 
defendant’s trial counsel will be deluged with an onslaught of discovery intended to 
harass and to pressure the defendant into a quick settlement.  Seemingly there would be 
no stopping a plaintiff from immediately bombarding the defendant’s trial counsel with 
document requests directed to the trial counsel’s own litigation files, and no doubt the 
plaintiff will barrage trial counsel with demands for depositions of every attorney on the 
trial team.   
¶71 Plaintiff’s frenzied attempts at invasive discovery of trial counsel will utterly 
destroy the work-product immunity and attorney-client privilege that is essential and 
fundamentally necessary to carrying out its representation of a client that is innocent until 
proven liable.  Indeed, the dire situation can predict a scenario where plaintiff’s counsel 
will be entitled to sit in on any face-to-face meetings or join any telephone conference 
between trial counsel and its client just in case the conversation might utter the words 
“non-infringement,” “invalidity,” “unenforceability,” or “opinion.”  Simply put, this is 
tantamount to denying the accused infringer’s right to effective assistance of trial 
counsel.  It is an unconstitutional, unacceptable, and misguided extension of Federal 
Circuit precedent.   
¶72 A bright line in the context of punitive damages – which in reality is what treble 
damages and attorneys’ fees amount to in today’s rising costs of patent litigation – exacts 
                                                 
169 Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en 
banc). 
170 In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
171 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; see also Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063 (2007) (“The 
Due Process Clause prohibits a State from punishing an individual without first providing that individual 
with ‘an opportunity to present every available defense.’”) (quoting Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 
(1972)); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416-18 (2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc. 
v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568, 575 (1996); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1991). 
172 U.S. CONST. amend. VII.   
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too much from the accused infringer and furthers no legitimate end.  Treble damages and 
attorneys’ fees can literally exceed tens of millions and hundreds of millions of dollars 
thereby leading a defendant directly into bankruptcy.  What can be more punitive than 
that? 
¶73 Plainly stated, too much is at stake in patent cases for a bright-line rule or 
automatic waiver that gives an opposing party unfettered carte blanche access (without 
exception) to all of trial counsel’s communications with the accused infringer in 
preparing for trial, discussing the merits of litigation strategy, or evaluating settlement.  
Either there would be a chilling effect on any and all communications between the 
defendant and its trial counsel, or the bright line would effectively eradicate the advice of 
counsel defense if it can only be used in exchange forfeiture of any further 
communications with trial counsel, which will likely result from a district court order that 
automatically trumps the work-product protection of trial counsel.   
¶74 The bright-line rule radically hinders an accused infringer from working with its 
trial counsel in order to defend itself and, consequently, deprives the accused infringer 
from its “day in court,” forcing coercive settlement where it is held hostage to the 
automatic waiver, and forfeiting any notion of fair play, fundamental fairness, and the 
right to participate fully in its defense.  And when it becomes open season by patent trolls 
on any would-be defendants, there will be great social costs that actually cripple 
legitimate research and development, stymie innovation, and chill healthy competition.173  
Nor does the bright-line rule comport with – in fact, it is at odds with – both Knorr-
Bremse and EchoStar.   
¶75 Simply put, the Federal Circuit never intended an all-or-nothing, everything is fair 
game, wholesale invasion of all communications between trial counsel and client 
concerning infringement, validity, and enforceability issues in the case as soon as the 
accused infringer asserts the opinion of counsel.174  It is inconceivable that the same court 
that would do away with the adverse inference175 instruction – which posed a threat to the 
attorney-client privilege and work-product immunity if a defendant exercised them in lieu 
of asserting the advice of counsel defense – would then nullify those privileges by 
substituting an equally perilous consequence to all who assert that very defense.  There 
must be a counterbalance.   
¶76 A balancing test would adequately take into account the longstanding right to rely 
on the opinion of counsel in defense of willfulness charges on the one side of the scale, 
and factors sufficient to find that a defendant waived the most sacrosanct of attorney 
client communications (that of trial counsel) on the other side of the scale.  A balancing 
                                                 
173 See Harkins, supra note 124 (arguing that costs of litigation create a carrot that patent trolls asserting 
paper patents may dangle in front of would-be defendants in order to extort a nuisance settlement, that there 
is a social harm caused by the crippling effect paper patent and patent troll litigation has on innovation, and 
that public interest would be served by introducing a defense to ensure an inventor had a functioning, 
operative device commensurate with the utility of the claimed invention). 
174 The EchoStar decision does not even involve the issue of trial counsel.  In re EchoStar, 448 F.3d 1294.  
Nor does Knorr-Bremse address the scope of the waiver that results from a party asserting the advice of 
counsel defense; if anything, Knorr-Bremse did away with the Damoclean repercussions of the “adverse 
inference.” See Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d 1337.  
175 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d 1337 at 1341 (“We now hold that no adverse inference that an opinion of 
counsel was or would have been unfavorable flows from an alleged infringer’s failure to obtain or produce 
an exculpatory opinion of counsel.”); see also id. at 1344 (“[N]o adverse inference shall arise from 
invocation of the attorney-client and/or work-product privilege.”).   
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N AL  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R TY  [ 2 0 0 7  
 
 236
test is consistent with the teachings of EchoStar and Knorr-Bremse, which emphasized 
the public interest in protecting the attorney-client privilege176 and work-product 
immunity.177  Under EchoStar, therefore, a district court should “balance” two competing 
policies:   
We recognize that the line between “factual” work product and “opinion” 
work product is not always distinct, especially when, as here, an attorney’s 
opinion may itself be “factual” work product.  When faced with the 
distinction between where that line lies, however, a district court should 
balance the policies to prevent sword-and-shield litigation tactics with the 
policy to protect work product.178 
¶77 In contrast, an automatic waiver and bright-line rule abdicates the district court’s 
obligation (and responsibility) of weighing the evidence in order to determine whether 
there had been any sword-and-shield tactics at play as shown by, for example, a 
defendant’s selective disclosure of opinions of counsel.  Furthermore, the automatic 
waiver and bright line rule ignore the policy in favor of the time-honored179 protection of 
attorney-client privilege and work-product immunity of trial counsel.   
¶78 A balancing test is also faithful to the Federal Circuit’s approach to willful 
infringement, which itself is a balancing test.  In fact, the en banc decision in Knorr-
Bremse reaffirmed that willfulness depends on the trier of fact considering the “totality of 
the circumstances”180 and held that failure to obtain an opinion of counsel “shall no 
longer provide an adverse inference or evidentiary presumption that such an opinion 
would have been unfavorable.”181  Moreover, the balancing test applies to district courts, 
because it is a bedrock principle of patent law that Federal Circuit precedent governs the 
issue of privilege and discoverability arising from assertion of the advice-of-counsel 
defense in response to charges of willful infringement.182   
                                                 
176 In re EchoStar, 448 F.3d at 1300-01. (“We recognize the privilege in order to promote full and frank 
communication between a client and his attorney so that the client can make well-informed legal decisions 
and conform his activities to the law.”); Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1344 (“There should be no risk of 
liability in disclosures to and from counsel in patent matters; such risk can intrude upon full communication 
and ultimately the public interest in encouraging open and confident relationships between client and 
attorney.”). 
177 In re EchoStar, 448 F.3d at 1301 (“We recognize work-product immunity because it promotes a fair and 
efficient adversarial system by protecting ‘the attorney’s thought processes and legal recommendations’ 
from the prying eyes of his or her opponent.”) (citing Genentech, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 122 F.3d 
1409, 1415 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
178 Id. at 1302 (emphasis added). 
179 The U.S. Supreme Court’s concern for protecting attorney-client communications as an essential means 
to effective representation is well settled, harkening back to at least as early as 1888.  Hunt v. Blackburn, 
128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888) (The privilege is “founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration 
of justice,” that a client and attorney ought to be able to communicate for the purpose of seeking and 
rendering legal services “free from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.”).   
180 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1342. 
181 Id. at 1346; see also id. at 1344 (“The adverse inference that an opinion was or would have been 
unfavorable, flowing from the infringer’s failure to obtain or produce an exculpatory opinion of counsel, is 
no longer warranted. Precedent authorizing such inference is overruled.”). 
182 In re EchoStar, 448 F.3d at 1298 (“[W]e apply our own law, rather than the law of the regional circuit.  
This case involves the extent to which a party waives its attorney-client privilege and work-product 
immunity when it asserts the advice-of-counsel defense in response to a charge of willful patent 
infringement.  ‘Federal Circuit law applies when deciding whether particular written or other materials are 
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¶79 And a plaintiff should not back-door an absolute privilege waiver by resorting to 
the accused infringer’s ongoing duty of care.  True, the Federal Circuit in Knorr-Bremse 
reaffirmed that “there continues to be ‘an affirmative duty of due care to avoid 
infringement of the known patent rights of others.’”183  The Federal Circuit got it right, 
but a plaintiff should not take that “duty” out of context.  In its proper context, the duty 
stems from the Federal Circuit’s decision in Underwater Devices184 where the infringer’s 
attorney, without first reviewing the PTO records185 relating to the patents at issue, had 
advised the client to “continue to refuse to even discuss the payment of a royalty.”186  
Under those facts, the court stressed the legal obligation to respect patents when the court 
pronounced the duty of care.187  But Underwater Devices neither raised nor addressed the 
attorney-client privilege.   
¶80 The Federal Circuit’s decision in Knorr-Bremse trumpeted the attorney-client 
privilege and work-product immunity by overruling any adverse inference to be drawn 
from a defendant’s exercising those privileges.  In other words, Federal Circuit precedent 
militates against an outcome whereby the duty of care overrides an accused infringer’s 
privilege the moment it asserts the advice of counsel defense to willful infringement that 
might subject that party to treble damages and attorneys’ fees.188  Such an outcome would 
render the privilege hollow and thereby inevitably relegate the advice of counsel defense 
                                                                                                                                                 
discoverable in a patent case, if those materials relate to an issue of substantive patent law.’”) (quoting 
Advanced Cardiovascular Sys. v. Medtronic, Inc., 265 F.3d 1294, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2001)); In re Spalding 
Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 803-04 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (applying Federal Circuit law to question of 
attorney-client privilege between patent attorney and patentee). 
183 Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1345 (quoting L.A. Gear Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F.2d 1117, 1127 
(Fed. Cir. 1993)).  
184 Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
185 The PTO records relating to an issued patent are usually called a “file history” or “prosecution history” 
in today’s parlance, and historically were called a “file wrapper.”  MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURE § 719, at 700-281 (8th ed. 2001, rev. Oct. 2005) [hereinafter MPEP] (“The folder in which the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office maintains the application papers is referred to as a file wrapper.”).  
Regardless of the nomenclature, these include all publicly accessible and non-expunged documents made 
of record in the folder that relate to the issued patent:  all papers submitted by the applicant to the PTO 
(e.g., the application as filed, powers of attorney, oaths/declarations of inventorship, invention disclosure 
statements), all correspondence from the PTO to the applicant relating to the examination of the application 
for patentability (“office actions” that reject patent claims or object to aspects of the specification, and prior 
art cited by the PTO as relevant to the claimed invention), all responses by the applicant to the PTO (such 
as amending the claims, making arguments, submitting declarations in support of patentability), and 
correspondence from the PTO in reply to the applicant, and so on until the patent is allowed and issued.  
The foregoing examples may be referred to as “pre-grant” papers, but there may also be “post-grant” papers 
such as post-grant amendments and oppositions.  
186 Underwater Devices, 717 F.2d at 1385. 
187 Id. at 1389-90 (“Where, as here, a potential infringer has actual notice of another’s patent rights, he has 
an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing,” including “the duty 
to seek and obtain competent legal advice from counsel before the initiation of any possible infringing 
activity.” (citations omitted)). 
188 Cf. Knorr-Bremse, 383 F.3d at 1348 (Dyk, J., dissenting in part).  Circuit Judge Dyk refused to join the 
majority’s decision on the continuing duty of care, because that duty raised a constitutional issue of 
whether treble damages for willful infringement (based on breaching the duty of care) was more akin to 
punitive damages, which the Supreme Court recently held could “only be awarded in situations where the 
conduct is reprehensible.”  Id. (citations omitted).  In contrast, a mere failure to engage in “due care” is not 
tantamount to reprehensible conduct, the plaintiff recovers what is tantamount to punitive damages based 
on the breach of due care.  Id. at 1351 (“When an infringer merely fails to exercise his supposed duty of 
care, there are ‘none of the circumstances ordinarily associated with egregiously improper conduct’ that 
could be sufficiently reprehensible to warrant imposition of punitive damages.”) (quoting BMW of N. Am., 
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 580 (1996)). 
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so perilous as to be foisted into the annals of bygone times.  A precarious privilege, or 
one that becomes null and void the moment a defendant asserts the advice of counsel 
defense, is little better than no privilege at all.  But if the purposes of the attorney-client 
privilege, the advice of counsel defense, and the duty of care are to be served, then the 
defendant should not face such ominous consequences unless the district court first 
engages in a balancing test in order to determine whether the accused infringer had 
played fast-and-loose with its opinion of counsel, had embarked on opinion shopping, or 
had engaged in selective production of opinions of counsel that it received in carrying out 
its duty to seek and obtain competent legal advice from counsel.  
¶81 Should it matter whether patent infringement defendants use lawyers from one 
law firm to act as trial counsel and other lawyers from the same firm to prepare a non-
infringement opinion as a defense to allegations of willful infringement?  According to 
the balancing test, that factor may be considered but would not be dispositive without 
weighing the evidence and making a finding based on underlying factors discussed 
below.  The rationale for the balancing test applies equally to all trial counsel, because if 
there is a bright-line rule or automatic waiver as to one trial counsel then the waiver could 
not be cured even if the defendant were to hire new trial counsel.  Otherwise stated, once 
the privilege is destroyed between the former trial counsel and the client, the opposing 
party would be free to comb through the files of, and take depositions of, former trial 
counsel over such broad topics as the strengths and weaknesses of the accused 
defendant’s positions on non-infringement, invalidity, and unenforceability.  That is too 
much. 
¶82 The balancing test requires that the district court consider the extent to which the 
trial counsel and the lawyers from the same or different firm were screened off from each 
other.  The proper balance would give the plaintiff sufficient leeway to pursue discovery 
from both the defendant and the counsel who rendered the opinion on which the accused 
infringer is relying in support of the advice of counsel defense, but the plaintiff cannot 
pursue discovery of the trial counsel without more.  For instance, if the potential infringer 
follows the rules and intentionally keeps the opinion counsel and trial counsel completely 
separate and independent such that trial counsel plays no role in, makes no contribution 
to, and does not influence the drafting of the opinion or otherwise breach the screening 
wall between itself and opining counsel, and the accused infringer did not engage in 
“opinion shopping,” then the discovery door leading to trial counsel ought to be closed to 
a plaintiff.  If plaintiff is in fact able to “pierce” the privilege, however, by showing 
through this discovery that trial counsel and opining counsel were not screened off from 
each other, that they collaborated, that the defendant engaged in opinion shopping, or that 
trial counsel contributed to or influenced the opinion either during preliminary drafts or 
with supplemental opinions after the initial formal opinion, then the district court may 
find that the work-product immunity and the attorney-client privilege have been waived 
as to trial counsel. 
B. Prejudice to the Accused Infringer 
¶83 Looking at another aspect of the scale, this factor of the coherent and equitable 
balancing test asks the district court to determine whether the defendant has been unfairly 
prejudiced.  As with the other factors, district courts are particularly suited for this factor 
of the balancing test.  For instance, district courts are regularly asked to decide 
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preliminary questions of the existence (or waiver) of a privilege.189  Similarly, district 
courts are called on to decide the metes and bounds of discovery, from the scope of 
permissible discovery that is not privileged,190 to claims of privilege or protection of trial 
preparation materials,191 to limits on the scope and manner of discovery in order to 
preserve a privilege.192  Likewise, district courts are adept at ruling on issues of whether 
or not evidence is sufficiently prejudicial to be excluded.193   
¶84 The district court can weigh and consider the plaintiff’s discovery tactics and 
make a judgment of whether the discovery hints at abuses.  Here, the court should be 
skeptical of a plaintiff whose initial discovery propounds document requests and 
deposition notices of trial counsel before the plaintiff has any reliable basis for piercing 
the privilege.  But the court might view the plaintiff’s attempted discovery differently if 
the plaintiff has first deposed opinion counsel or the defendant’s witnesses, and based on 
that discovery the plaintiff can show that the trial counsel played a role in, made 
contributions to, and influenced the drafting of the opinion, or that there was a breach of 
the screening wall between trial and opining counsel.   
¶85 Also, the time that has elapsed between the date when the accused infringer 
received the opinion (on which it is relying) and the date on which it was served with the 
complaint might give rise to prejudice based on the defendant’s detrimental reliance.  For 
instance, if a defendant relies on an opinion of counsel prepared promptly after receiving 
a cease and desist letter, but the plaintiff sits on its rights for some time before suing the 
defendant, then there has been sufficient time to cause a break between the opinion of 
counsel and the trial counsel.  In weighing the evidence, the court can “borrow” from 
familiar common law principles of laches and estoppel.194   
                                                 
189 FED. R. EVID. 104(a) (“Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, 
the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court.”). 
190 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (“Unless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with these rules, 
the scope of discovery is [that parties] may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged.”). 
191 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(A) (“When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable under these 
rules by claiming that it is privileged or subject to protection as trial-preparation material, the party shall 
make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of the documents, communications, or things not 
produced or disclosed in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected, will 
enable other parties [and the court upon a motion to compel] to assess the applicability of the privilege or 
protection.”). 
192 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (“Upon motion by a party or by the person from whom discovery is sought . . . and 
for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending . . . may make any order which justice 
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden 
[including] that the disclosure or discovery not be had . . . .”); FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(1) (“A person may 
instruct a deponent not to answer only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation 
directed by the court, or to present a motion under Rule 30(d)(4).”). 
193 FED. R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by 
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”); Montana 
v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 41-43 (1996) (Due Process does not guarantee a plaintiff’s right to introduce all 
relevant evidence and, therefore, the district court may exclude evidence without necessarily running afoul 
of plaintiff’s Due Process.).   
194 See, e.g., Pruitt v. City of Chicago, 472 F.3d 925, 929 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing laches); Blue Cross & 
Blue Shield Ass’n v. Am. Express Co., 467 F.3d 634, 640-41 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing laches); Hollander 
v. Brown, 457 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2006) (discussing equitable estoppel); A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. 
Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020 passim (Fed. Cir. 1992) (laches and estoppel in the patent context 
relating to damages). 
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¶86 As another example, a defendant who first receives actual notice of plaintiff’s 
patent rights at the time it received the patent infringement complaint and promptly 
receives an opinion of counsel, might assert the opinion of counsel.  How entrenched is 
trial counsel in the case?  The longer plaintiff waits, the more prejudice to the accused 
infringer.  In the foregoing scenario of a post-litigation opinion, if the plaintiff relied on 
(or possessed) purported privilege piercing evidence, then the plaintiff must not wait 
months or years into the case before requesting the court to decide whether to allow 
discovery into trial counsel communications.  Given that plaintiff seeks to invade trial 
counsel communications, the integrity of the patent litigation system can brook no delay.  
There should be no signs of ambush or gamesmanship.195  
¶87 Furthermore, the district court is in the best position to decide how much weight 
to give to the defendant’s relationship to the trial counsel.  If trial counsel is the national 
patent counsel for the defendant, the only patent counsel to have appeared in the case, 
and has a comparative advantage to new counsel based on previous trials over the 
accused products or intimate knowledge of the defendant’s business, then the court ought 
to be allowed to weigh these factors in the prejudice calculus, and of course the plaintiff’s 
counsel should be heard in response.196   
¶88 A plaintiff may be expected to counter with arguments that a waiver (or even 
disqualification of trial counsel) is mandated by ethical canons.  Those are misplaced.  
Federal Circuit law controls the issue of advice of counsel defense and its impact on any 
waiver of attorney-client privilege or attorney work product.197   
¶89 In Crossroads,198 for example, no prejudice was argued by the defendant, no 
prejudice was shown, and no prejudice was found.  Rather, the court found the “absence 
of any colorable argument for prejudice”199 for at least two reasons.  First, the defendant 
had known relatively early in the case (and long before the disqualification motion) the 
court’s position that it would not allow trial counsel to present the defendant’s case to the 
jury when opining counsel was a member of trial counsel’s firm.200  Second, the 
defendant’s trial counsel admitted there would be no prejudice if they were disqualified, 
                                                 
195 Plaintiff’s mere conclusory, unsubstantiated letter that it will seek trial counsel communications is 
inadequate to allow defendant to make an informed decision of whether or not to assert the advice of 
counsel and risk privileged communications with trial counsel.  Otherwise, it would be pro forma for 
plaintiff to send such “notice” in every case, thereby rendering the prejudice factor null and void.  While 
plaintiff need not show its hand in other aspects of the case, when it comes to the important matter of 
advice of counsel versus adequate assistance of counsel, the plaintiff should come clean.  After all, the 
Federal Rules require a party to certify (before brining a discovery motion) that “the movant has in good 
faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without 
court action.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a). 
196 Plaintiff might argue the relevance of trial counsel’s view of the evidence.  Even if relevant (which it is 
not), trial counsel’s view of the evidence must not become a focal point of the trial.  That would lead to a 
“trial within a trial,” and might lure the fact finder into a finding of willfulness on a ground different from 
proof specific to the defendant’s state of mind.  
197 See supra note 182. 
198 Crossroads Sys. (Tex.), Inc. v. Dot Hill Sys. Corp., No. 03-754, 2006 WL 1544621 (W.D. Tex. May 31, 
2006).  
199 Id. at *11.   
200 Plaintiff filed its case on October 17, 2003.  The district court granted the disqualification motion on 
May 31, 2006.  The defendant had “been aware of the Court’s position on this issue since September of 
2004, and to the extent it has failed to prepare for this eventuality, the responsibility for this failure falls 
squarely on its shoulders.”  Id.  
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because there were two other patent firms that had sufficient knowledge of the case and 
had been intimately involved from the beginning.201   
¶90 Having found no prejudice resulting from disqualifying only one of the 
defendant’s three trial counsel, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion to disqualify 
because the court believed such a result was mandated by ethical canons.  Not so.   
¶91 To the contrary, proper reliance on the applicable ethical canons in Crossroads 
would not have required disqualification.  Of the Model Code,202 the Model Rules,203 and 
the Texas Rules,204 only the Model Code prohibits a lawyer, or the lawyer’s “firm,” from 
serving as trial counsel when another lawyer in the “firm” may be a witness.  In contrast, 
the Model Rules (which Texas follows) firmly rejected this strict provision of the Model 
Code and, by doing so, gave greater weight to the client’s interest, thereby concluding 
that a client should be allowed to consent to be represented by the law “firm.”205  This 
distinction, and the fact that the Texas Rules follow the Model Rules, thereby rejecting 
the Model Code, does not appear to have been made by the defendants.  As a result, the 
court never considered this argument, and thereby placed its reliance on the Model Code, 
as opposed to the Model Rules upon which the Texas Rules are based.  Indeed, the 
Crossroads decision held that “under these circumstances” all members of the “firm” 
would be disqualified.  But the court cited for its support neither the Texas Rules nor the 
Model Rules.  Instead, it cited a case that was based on the Model Code.206 
C. An Objectively Reasonable Need for the Evidence 
¶92 All “helpful” evidence to a plaintiff’s cause will naturally be “needed” by a 
plaintiff.  The objectively reasonable need for the evidence factor of the proposed 
coherent and equitable balancing test as put forth in this article, however, speaks to the 
question of whether some concededly relevant evidence can only be obtained by 
compelling production of trial counsel communications, which has the potential of 
leading to unfairness to the defendant, discovery abuses, and gamesmanship.  This 
“objectively reasonable need” factor is no more or less than what district courts presently 
                                                 
201 Id. (“In any event, as Dot Hill’s own [trial] counsel noted at the hearing when this issue first arose, Dot 
Hill is being ably represented by several competent attorneys from two law firms besides [trial counsel].”).  
202 See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 5-101(b) (1980) (“[a] lawyer shall not accept or 
continue employment as an advocate before a tribunal in a contemplated or pending adjudicatory 
proceeding if the lawyer knows or believes that the lawyer is or may be a witness necessary to establish an 
essential fact on behalf of the lawyer’s client [unless certain enumerated exceptions apply].”).   
203 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.7(b) (1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES] (“A lawyer may 
act as advocate in a trial in which another lawyer in the lawyer’s firm is likely to be called as a witness . . . 
.”).     
204 See W.D. TEX. R. AT-4; TEXAS DISCIPLINARY RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT 3.08(c) (1989) (“Without the 
client’s informed consent, a lawyer may not act as advocate in an adjudicatory proceeding in which another 
lawyer in the lawyer’s firm is prohibited . . . from serving as advocate.”).   
205 See MODEL RULES, supra note 203.  Only about three states follow the more stringent Model Code, 
whereas about forty-seven states (including Texas) follow the Model Rules.  See MORGAN & ROTUNDA, 
supra note 109, at 165-67. 
206 Crossroads Sys. (Texas), Inc. v. Dot Hill Sys. Corp., No. 03-754, 2006 WL 1544621, at *10 (W.D. Tex. 
May 31, 2006) (“[A] strict prohibition on all members of the testifying lawyer’s firm serving as trial 
counsel is appropriate.”) (citing Dynasty Apparel Indus., Inc. v. Rentz, 206 F.R.D. 596, 599 (S.D. Ohio 
2001) (“[W]hen one lawyer is disqualified under DR 5-101(B), because he will testify as a witness, his 
entire law firm and all other lawyers in it must also be disqualified.”)).  
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do when deciding, by court order, whether to limit discovery under the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure: 
The frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods otherwise 
permitted under these rules and by any local rule shall be limited by the 
court if it determines that:  (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably 
cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is 
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the party seeking 
discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to obtain 
the information sought; or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed 
discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the 
case, the amount in controversy, the parties’ resources, the importance of 
the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed 
discovery in resolving the issues.  The court may act upon its own 
initiative after reasonable notice or pursuant to a motion under Rule 
26(c).207  
¶93 Therefore, one virtue of this “objectively reasonable need” factor is that it 
depends from familiar concepts and well-established principles in law.  This need factor 
is essential, because violation of trial counsel’s work-product immunity and attorney-
client privilege is a drastic measure to be avoided unless absolutely necessary.  Some 
guidelines for courts to weigh in making that judgment are discussed next.   
1. Willfulness Hinges on the Accused Infringer’s State of Mind, not of Trial Counsel 
¶94 The accused infringer’s “intent and reasonable beliefs are the primary focus of the 
willfulness inquiry.”208  Because the willfulness inquiry centers on the “infringer’s state 
of mind,”209 the opinion counsel generally would not be competent to give an opinion of 
what was in another’s mind.210  Rather, the focus is on whether the opinion, on which the 
accused infringer relies in support of the advice of counsel defense, was sufficient to 
“instill a belief in the infringer that a court might reasonably hold the patent is invalid, 
not infringed, or unenforceable.”211   
¶95 Consequently, the critical component of the defense is the effect of the opinion on 
the defendant, and whether it was reasonable for the defendant to rely on that opinion.212  
Therefore, the pivotal focus should be on evaluating the nature of the opinion itself and 
the effect it had on the defendant’s action.213  The plaintiff who seeks trial counsel 
communications should first take the deposition of the defendant and then be required to 
                                                 
207 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2). 
208 Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
209 “Work-product waiver extends only so far as to inform the court of the infringer’s state of mind.”  In re 
EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2006).   
210 FED. R. EVID. 602 (“A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to 
support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.”).  Preliminary questions 
“concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness” are determined by the court.  FED. R. EVID. 
104(a).  
211 Ortho Pharm., 959 F.2d at 944. 
212 SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech. Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1465 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
213 Amsted Indus. Inc. v. Buckeye Steel Castings Co., 24 F.3d 178, 182 (Fed. Cir. 1994).  
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show a nexus between its action and trial counsel’s breach of the screening wall,214 giving 
serious consideration to the question of whether the defendant relied primarily215 on the 
asserted opinion of counsel.   
2. Opinion Counsel Generally Is Not a Necessary Witness 
¶96 Opinion of counsel letters on which the defendant is relying generally must be 
examined by the four corners216 of those letters.  EchoStar 217 expressed concern over a 
defendant who produces only favorable letters while withholding unfavorable letters that 
might have led to opinion shopping.  Assuming all such opinion letters from opinion 
counsel have been produced, then opinion counsel may be deposed as to the letter and as 
to what counsel told the client.  Because opinion counsel tends to give testimony 
favorable to the defendant, plaintiffs rarely call the defendant’s opinion counsel at trial, 
and given Federal Circuit precedent that it is the client’s state of mind that matters, 
opinion counsel cannot give competent testimony to establish another’s state of mind.  
But, nonetheless, plaintiff should be given the opportunity to show competency of 
opinion counsel and a legitimate expectation of calling that counsel at trial.218   
3. Whether There Is A Substantial Need for the Trial Counsel’s Testimony? 
¶97 If opinion counsel is not a necessary party, then it is doubtful that trial counsel’s 
testimony would be needed.  Indeed, the Federal Circuit has held that the importance of 
an opinion of counsel “does not depend on its legal correctness.”219  Because the inquiry 
ought to be the four corners of the opinion and the accused infringer’s reasonable reliance 
on that opinion,220 mere comments by trial counsel should be excluded as little more than 
cumulative evidence of the written opinion or otherwise obtainable from some other 
source such as testimony from the client or documents exchanged between opinion 
                                                 
214 In every case, the trial counsel’s litigation strategy, expertise, and competence as attorneys can be said to 
have an “effect” on the defendant’s action, but that is not the type of evidence for demonstrating a breach 
or that trial counsel played a role in, made contributions to, or influenced the drafting of the opinion.   
215 To the extent that trial counsel’s communications related to the opinion, that evidence arguably would 
be merely cumulative of the opinion, FED. R. EVID. 403, and therefore should be held insufficient to 
implicate the stark consequences of destroying the trial counsel’s privilege.   
216 Studiengesellschaft Kohle v. Dart Indus., Inc., 862 F.2d 1564, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (quoting 
Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1983)); Steelcase Inc. 
v. Haworth, Inc., 954 F. Supp. 1195, 1200 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (“the issue is the opinion’s reasonableness 
within its four corners”).  
217 In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (“However, selective waiver of 
the privilege may lead to the inequitable result that the waiving party could waive its privilege for favorable 
advice while asserting its privilege on unfavorable advice.”). 
218 The court may consider whether plaintiff’s threat to call opinion counsel is merely a trial tactic to 
disqualify trial counsel under a Crossroads analysis, or whether counsel is truly a necessary witness.  Liz 
Claiborne, Inc. v. Consumer Prod. Recovery, No. 04-819, 2004 WL 1496537, at *3-4 (N.D. Tex. June 30, 
2004); Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95-8833, 2000 WL 1006235, at *5 
(S.D. N.Y. July 19, 2000) (“Thus, as this Court has pointed out, the issues are limited to whether the 
[counsel’s] opinion letter is a competent opinion and what Bristol’s state of mind was when it decided to 
rely on it.  In other words, was there reasonable reliance by Bristol?  Bristol’s management witnesses are 
the proper parties to be examined on that subject, not [counsel].”). 
219 Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 944 (Fed. Cir. 1992).   
220 See supra Parts IV.C.1 and IV.C.2.  
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counsel and the client.221  Therefore, trial counsel’s agreement or disagreement with the 
opinion would not justify the wholesale invasion of trial counsel’s privilege.   
¶98 While willful infringement should not be trivialized, something more must be 
shown before a defendant faces a decision of whether to give up a key defense to charges 
of willful infringement or to choose the effective assistance of counsel.  Nevertheless, 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, district courts are accustomed to deciding important 
issues of whether there has been a “showing that the party seeking discovery has 
substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party’s case and that the party is 
unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by 
other means.”222  Therefore, this factor has the virtue of placing district courts on familiar 
territory.   
D. Irreparable Harm to the Plaintiff 
¶99 The plaintiff should be expected to shoulder the initial burden of showing 
irreparable harm to it if denied trial counsel communications.  Here, district courts may 
borrow traditional common law notions of irreparable harm as they have done in other 
contexts, such as with injunctive relief.223 
¶100 Logistically, therefore, a defendant would assert the advice of counsel defense to 
willful infringement.224  The plaintiff would take traditional discovery of opinion counsel 
and defendant’s witnesses on conventional issues relating to the advice of counsel 
defense.  If there is evidence that trial counsel wore two hats – if any member of the trial 
team also played a role in, contributed to, influenced the opinion on which the defendant 
relies, or breached the screening wall – then the defendant would have an opportunity to 
withdraw the advice of counsel defense.  Withdrawal would be with prejudice, defendant 
could not be heard to disavow the decision later in the case, and there would be 
presumptive irreparable harm to the plaintiff if defendant should attempt to recant its 
informed decision to give up the advice of counsel defense to charges of willful 
infringement.   
¶101 Here, however, the policy against sword-and-shield litigation tactics works both 
ways.  The plaintiff might not be able to show irreparable harm if it amends the 
complaint to assert additional patents that were not at issue at the time of the hearing and 
for which the screening wall has been perfectly maintained.  In granting leave to allow 
                                                 
221 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2) (The court has discretion to limit discovery when “the discovery sought is 
unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from some other source that is more convenient, 
less burdensome, or less expensive.”); FED. R. EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if 
its probative value is substantially outweighed by . . . considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”). 
222 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).  
223 See, e.g., Christian Legal Soc’y v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 859 (7th Cir. 2006); Belgium v. United States, 
452 F.3d 1289, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 2006).   
224 Defendant’s assertion would automatically stay any attempted discovery.  The rationale for the 
automatic stay is that a bell cannot be un-rung.   Such automatic stays are becoming more common among 
district court local rules, gaining in acceptance by counsel, and appearing with increasing frequency in 
parties’ stipulated protective orders that are intended to protect highly confidential information.  See, e.g., 
D.C. COLO. L. CIV. R. 30.2 (“Pending resolution of any motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) or 30(d), no 
party, attorney, or witness is required to appear at the deposition to which the motion is directed until the 
motion has been resolved.  The filing of a motion under either of these rules shall stay the discovery to 
which the motion is directed until further order of the court.”).  
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the plaintiff to amend the complaint,225 a district court can tie its decision to granting 
defendant’s motion to assert the advice of counsel defense to the newly added patent.226  
Alternatively, the district court may sever227 plaintiff’s infringement claim on the new 
patent, or may bifurcate willfulness228 for that patent.    
¶102 Only if the defendant maintains the advice of counsel defense would the court 
need to hear a motion on whether to pierce the trial counsel privilege.  Thus, the timing of 
the hearing promotes judicial efficiency and avoids unnecessary motion practice should 
the defendant assert but then withdraw its defense based on revelations of discovery 
through traditional methods associated with proving and rebutting that defense.   
¶103 The burden of production and burden of persuasion229 of proving willful 
infringement remains with the plaintiff and, given that the advice of counsel defense is a 
“defense,”230 the burden of choosing to give up this key defense or preserve the privilege 
with trial counsel would shift to the defendant only after plaintiff’s initial showing that 
the privilege was pierced, the screen wall breached, or anyone from the trial team wore 
two hats.231  Moreover, this shifting burden would dovetail with Federal Circuit precedent 
on the parties’ respective burdens:  
The patentee bears the burden of persuasion and must prove willful 
infringement by clear and convincing evidence. . . .  ‘The patentee must 
present threshold evidence of culpable behavior’ before the burden of 
production shifts to the accused to put on evidence that it acted with due 
care. . . . ‘Absent an initial presentation of evidence this burden of coming 
forward in defense does not arise.’  That threshold showing cannot be 
satisfied merely by proof that the accused is asserting the attorney-client 
privilege to withhold an opinion of counsel.232  
                                                 
225 FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a) (“Otherwise a party may amend the party’s pleading only by leave of court or by 
written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.”). 
226 Id. (“A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading within the time remaining for response to 
the original pleading or within 10 days after service of the amended pleading, which period may be the 
longer, unless the court otherwise orders.”). 
227 FED. R. CIV. P. 42(b) (“The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate 
trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any claim, cross-claim, 
counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of any number of claims, cross-claims, 
counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues, always preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared 
by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States.”). 
228 Quantum Corp. v. Tandon Corp., 940 F.2d 642, 644 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (district courts may give “serious 
consideration” to holding a separate trial on the willfulness issue when attorney-client communications may 
be revealed). 
229 FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.12 at 414 
(5th ed. 2001) (Embodied in the term “burden of proof,” “[t]he two distinct concepts may be referred to as 
(1) the risk of nonpersuasion, sometimes called the ‘burden of persuasion,’ and (2) the duty of producing 
evidence (or the burden of production), sometimes called the burden of going forward with the evidence.”).  
These two concepts can be distinguished by the fact that the burden of production can shift back and forth 
between parties during the trial, unlike the burden of persuasion.  
230 Id. (Often, “courts have confused the ideas of affirmative defense and negation by affirmative proof.”). 
For a discussion of the differences between an affirmative defense and a defense, see id., § 4.5, at 247-50. 
231 Consequently, plaintiff’s bald face, conclusory argument or allegation of willfulness in its initial 
pleading (without more) would ring hollow and be entitled to no weight, even though it compels the 
defendant to assert the advice of counsel defense for fear of waiving that defense if not timely pled.   
232 Golden Blount, Inc. v. Robert H. Peterson Co., 438 F.3d 1354, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (internal citations, 
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¶104 If the court should find that the factors of the coherent and equitable balancing 
test militate in plaintiff’s favor, then the court may order limited discovery of defendant’s 
trial counsel communications.233  
V. CONCLUSION 
¶105 As a defense to pro forma, template allegations of willfulness, a patent 
infringement defendant oftentimes obtains an opinion of counsel.  Trouble is brewing, 
however, for the defendant as the 2006 Federal Circuit decision in EchoStar234 has set off 
a veritable feeding frenzy of attacks by plaintiffs’ counsel on the most sacred of attorney 
client communications and work product:  that of trial counsel.   
¶106 Plaintiffs pretend that the EchoStar decision creates a bright-line rule of absolute 
waiver of all attorney-client privileges and work-product immunities.  Such an approach 
forecasts ominous consequences where a plaintiff may foist document requests and 
deposition notices on the trial team, and justify its discovery tactics with the bold 
assertion that EchoStar has empowered plaintiffs to listen in on the defendant’s 
communications with trial counsel whenever a defendant asserts the advice of counsel 
defense and may be discussing non-infringement of the patent or any other issue that is 
the subject of the opinion of counsel on which the defendant relies.  The upshot will be a 
defendant and its trial team that cease communications critical to preparing the case for 
trial or even evaluating the case for settlement.  Such invasive discovery abuses are rabid 
attempts to place the accused infringer between Scylla and Charybdis:  choosing between 
the advice of counsel defense to willful patent infringement on the one hand, or the 
effective assistance of trial counsel on the other. 
¶107 This article argues that any reliance on EchoStar for a bright-line, automatic, 
absolute waiver of trial counsel communications is misplaced, inconsistent with, and 
contradictory to the language, tenor, and overriding policies set forth in EchoStar, Knorr-
Bremse,235 and other Federal Circuit precedent.  This article argues that the Federal 
Circuit would not do away with the adverse inference instruction – which had posed a 
threat to the attorney-client privilege and work-product immunity if a defendant exercised 
them in lieu of asserting the advice of counsel defense – only to nullify those privileges 
and protections to all who assert that very defense for which the adverse inference was 
overruled.  Indeed, given the Federal Circuit’s view on the necessity of full and frank 
                                                                                                                                                 
ellipses, and brackets omitted); see also id. (“As we explained in Knorr-Bremse, this court’s precedent had 
(until that point) aided the patentee in making its case on willfulness by permitting the trier of fact to infer 
from an alleged infringer’s failure to produce an opinion letter that such an opinion, if rendered, was or 
would have been unfavorable to the alleged infringer.  We overruled this precedent and held that ‘[t]he 
adverse inference that an opinion was or would have been unfavorable, flowing from the infringer’s failure 
to obtain or produce an exculpatory opinion of counsel, is no longer warranted.’”) (citation omitted). 
233 Given the need for a proper balance between plaintiff’s right to prove willfulness and the time-honored 
attorney-client privilege and work-product immunity, the district court or magistrate should limit the 
discovery so that the pierced privilege exception does not swallow the attorney-client privilege and work-
product immunity.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c) (The district court “may make any order which justice 
requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden.”).  
Limits on discovery are also advisable because unfair and irreparable prejudice to the defendant cannot be 
undone.  
234 In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
235 Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (en 
banc). 
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communications between an attorney and client, and its overruling an adverse inference 
when a defendant exercises the attorney-client privilege, this precedent militates against 
an argument that, based on Underwater Devices,236 the duty of care trumps an accused 
infringer’s attorney-client privilege or work-product immunity the moment when an 
accused infringer should assert the advice of counsel defense to willful infringement. 
¶108 In place of the all-or-nothing, wholesale destruction of the attorney-client 
privilege or work-product immunity propounded by plaintiff and some district courts, this 
article has proposed a coherent and equitable balancing test that will bring clarity and 
fairness to the potentially chilling effect on discussions between the defendant and its 
trial team in the wake of EchoStar.  The Federal Circuit precedent clearly demands a 
balancing test and forsakes a bright-line rule where a district court abdicates an obligation 
to weigh the evidence.  One virtue of the “balancing” test proposed in this article is that it 
depends from familiar concepts and well-established principles of patent law, rules of 
evidence, and rules of civil procedure.  Another virtue is that the balancing test will not 
complicate the case to any appreciable extent given what is at stake:  the time-honored 
trial counsel’s privilege and a defendant’s right, when facing punitive treble damages, to 
effective assistance of trial counsel. 
                                                 
236 Underwater Devices, Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., 717 F.2d 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1983). 
